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PARITY CODETERMINATION IN WEST
GERMAN COMPANIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Wilhelm Wengler*
I. THE PROPOSED Acr
A.

Elements of Parity Codetermination

German Law on joint stock companies,I in conformity with that
of nearly all other countries, has long provided that the organs of
the joint stock company (Aktiengesellschaft) consist either exclusively of the shareholders themselves (i.e., the general meeting of
shareholders) or are elected by them (i.e., the Aufsichtsrat or supervisory board), or that such an elected organ in turn appoint
another organ (i.e., the Vorstand or executive board). Ever since
the "old" Labor Management Relations Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of October 11, 1952, however, only two-thirds of
the membership of the supervisory boards 2 of the larger joint

stock companies are elected by the general meeting of stockholders and one-third by the company's work force.' Special legal
dispositions were enacted for enterprises in the coal, iron, and steel
industry by the act of May 21, 1951.1
The essential element of so-called economic codetermination on
the basis of parity (or simply "parity codetermination"), as found
in the Codetermination Bill of 1974, 5 is to change the existing law
as follows: in the future, half the membership of the supervisory
board of any joint stock company with a work force of more than
2000 is to be elected by the shareholders, and half by the company
*

Professor Emeritus, Free University of Berlin, West Berlin.

1. The Federal Act on Joint Stock Companies has been in force in the Federal
Republic since Jan. 1, 1966. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI. 1089 [hereinafter
cited as AktG]. Until then, the relevant act of Jan. 30, 1937, [1937] RGB1. 107,
was in force. The procedure for the election of the supervisory board by the
general shareholders meeting is essentially the same in both acts.
2. The German joint stock company has not only an executive board (board
of directors, Vorstand), but also has a second board called the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat).

3. Law of Oct. 11, 1952, [1952] BGB1. 681. The provisions of this act are not
applicable if all shares are in the hands of a family or of a single natural person
and if there are no more than 500 workers and employees.
4. Law of May 21, 1952, [1953] BGB1. 347.
5. Parliamentary Paper of the Bundesrat (Federal Council) No. 200/1974. The
English text of the statute, as translated by Dr. Martin Peltzer, is available
together with Dr. Peltzer's English introduction from Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt
KG (Cologne, 1974).
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work force. Those board members not elected by the shareholders
may include persons who are not working for the company but who
are trade union functionaries. In case of tie votes within the board
thus constituted, various procedural solutions are envisioned according to the Bill.
Under the proposed law members of the supervisory board not
elected by the shareholders would have equal voting rights on all
matters for which the board is competent, and not only for matters
pertaining to the working conditions of the company's work force.
In questions of special concern to the work force, the organs of the
company are already required by existing laws, especially the
"new" Labor Management Relations Act of January 15, 1972, to
consult the works council-the elected representatives of the company's work force-or to obtain its approval before taking certain
measures. In addition under the old Labor Management Relations
Act, as well as under the proposed Codetermination Bill of 1974,
the board members not elected by shareholders participate in decisions dealing with investments or other dispositions of the property
of the joint stock company, even if the interests of the work force
are not affected.

The proposed Bill is to apply to all companies established under
the laws of the Federal Republic. Thus it would extend to West
German companies whose stock is held exclusively, predominantly, or partly by foreigners and foreign companies, so long as
the "controlled" German company has a work force of over 2000.
Controlling foreign parent companies-which, after all, may have
an organizational structure totally different from the German company in question-are themselves not affected by the draft law. If,
however, a foreign company controls several German companies,
the work force of all of the companies is to be aggregated so that,
if the total is more than 2000, the company most closely related to
the central management of the combine may be subjected to the
act, even if the work force of that particular company remains
below 2000.
B. Impact on American Shareholders
The result of applying parity codetermination to West German
joint stock companies in which American nationals or companies
are shareholders would be a serious reduction of their influence in
the company, for the supervisory board of a German joint stock
6. Codetermination Bill of 1974 § 6.
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company, though not apparent from its name, is actually the organ
that makes the major decisions on company policy. In particular,
it can decide that certain decisions may be taken by the executive
board only with its approval. Further, the supervisory board selects the members of the executive board, which represents the
company in its dealings with third parties and conducts the dayto-day business of the enterprise. Under the proposed Codetermination Bill of 1974, the supervisory board (composed of an equal
number of representatives of the shareholders and of the work
force) elects the executive board by a two-thirds majority; if this
majority cannot be attained, involved procedures are provided to
break the deadlock and insure that an executive board is constituted.
How radically the application of the Codetermination Bill would
change the conditions on the basis of which American capital was
originally invested in a German company is apparent, particularly

in the case of companies in which 50 per cent of the capital is of
American and 50 per cent of German origin,7 and where the two
groups of investors have concluded agreements concerning the persons to be elected as members of the supervisory board and executive board, and concerning the business policy to be followed by
those organs. Agreements such as those customary among shareholders when all the capital is firmly in the hands of a small number of persons or companies would become inoperative were the
supervisory board no longer composed of a majority of shareholder
representatives. Among other consequences, this might enable the
German shareholders in cooperation with the work force representatives to strengthen their own position in the management of the
company at the expense of the American shareholders, and to circumvent contractual obligations toward the latter.
7. It can be submitted that most American investments in joint stock companies in the Federal Republic have not been effectuated by means of the acquisition of shares of existing German companies by individual American purchasers
on the stock market, but by the incorporation of new German companies whollyowned by the American parent company, or by the incorporation of German
companies whose shares split equally between an American and a German com-

pany. Sometimes American capital is invested not in joint stock companies but
in "limited liability companies" (Gesellschaften mit beschranter Haftung or
GmbH). This legal form is particularly suitable for what is called a close corporation in the United States. GmbH's, too, would be subject to the planned codetermination law, if their work force exceeds 2000.
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HI.

PARITY CODETERMINATION UNDER THE GERMAN-AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL TREATY

A.

Relevant Articles

The following analysis deals with whether alteration by parity
codetermination of the management structure of German joint
stock companies in which American nationals have invested capital would be compatible with provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1954 between the Federal Republic and the United States, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [German-American Commercial Treaty].
The relevant articles are set out below.
Artikel V

Article V

1. Das Eigentum der Staatsangehbrigen und Gesellschaften des einen Vertragsteils genieBt in dem Gebiet des anderen
Vertragsteils weitestgehenden Schutz und
Sicherheit.

1. Property of nationals and companies
of either Party shall receive the most constant protection and security within the
territories of the other Party.

3. Keiner der beiden Vertragsteile darf
unbillige oder diskriminierende MaBnahmen ergreifen, durch welche die in seinem
Gebiet von den Staatsangeharigen und
Gesellschaften des anderen Vertragsteils
rechtmiBig erworbenen Ansprfiche oder
Interessen an den von ihnen errichteten
Unternehmen oder an dem von ihnen durch
Kapital oder durch ihr technisches K6nnen, Wissen oder Geghick hierzu geleisteten Beitrag beeintrtichtigt wiirden.

3. Neither Party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would
impair the legally acquired rights or interests within its territories of nationals and
companies of the other Party in the enterprises which they have established, in their
capital, or in the skills, arts or technology
which they have applied.

4. Eigentum von Staatsangeh6rigen
oder Gesellschaften des einen Vertragsteils
darf in dem Gebiet des anderen Vertragsteils nur zum allgemeinen Wohl unter
Gewfhrung einer gerechten Entschfdigung
und der M6glichkeit, den Rechtsweg zu
schreiten, enteignet werden. Die Entschadigung muB dem Wert des entzogenen Eigentums entsprechen; sie muB tatsgchlich
verwertbar sein und ohne unn6tige Verz6gerung geleistet werden. Splitestens im
Zeitpunkt der Enteignung muB in angepsener Weise fdr die Festsetzung und Leistung
der Entschtidigung Vorsorge getroffen sein.

4. Property of nationals and companies
of either Party shall not be taken within the
territories of the other Party, except for the
public benefit and in accordance with due
process of law, nor shall it be taken without
just compensation. Such compensation
shall represent the equivalent of the property taken and shall be made in an effectively realizable form and without unnecessary delay. Adequate provision shall have
been made at latest by the time of the taking for the determination and the giving of
the compensation.

Artikel VII

Article VII

1. Den Staatsangeh6rigen und Gesellschaften jedes Vertragsteils wird in dem
Gebiet des anderen Vertragsteils Inlfnderbehandlung hinsichtlich der Auscibung

1. Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other Party, national treatment
with respect to engaging in all types of

6
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jeder Art von geschiftlicher, industrieller,
finanzieller oder sonstiger gegen Entgelt
vorgenommener Titigkeit gewdhrt. Dabei
ist es unerheblich, ob sie diese selbstindig
oder unselbstindig und ob sie sie unmittelbar oder durch einen Vertreter oder durch
juristische Personen jeder Art austiben.
Dementsprechend ddrfen diese Staatsangeh6rigen und Gesellschaften innerhalf des
genannten Gebiets
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commercial, industrial, financial and other
activity for gain, whether in a dependent or
an independent capacity, and whether directly or by agent or through the medium
of any form of lawful juridical entity. Accordingly, such nationals and companies
shall be permitted within such territories:

a)

Zweigstellen, Vertretungen, Bdros,
Fabriken und andere zur Fuhrunc
ihrer Geschafte geeignete Betriebe errichten und unterhalten,

a)

to establish and maintain branches,
agencies, offices, factories and other
establishments appropriate to the
conduct of their business;

b)

nach dem Gesellschaftsrecht des anderen Vertragsteils Gessellschaften
gr6nden und Mehrheitsbeteiligungen
an Gesellschaften des anderen Vertragsteils erwerben,

b)

to organize companies under the general company laws of such other
Party, and to acquire majority interests in companies of such other Party;
and

c)

von ihnen errichtete oder erworbene
Unternehmen kontrollieren und leiten.

c)

to control and manage enterprises
which they have established or acquired.

Auch wird den von ihnen kontrollierten
Unternehmen, seien es solche von Einzelkaufleuten oder Gesellschaften oder sonstige Unternehmen, in allen mit ihrer Bettigung zusammenhangenden Angelegenheiten keine ungidnstigere Behandlung
gewfhrt als gleichartigen Unternehmen,
die von Staatsangeh6rigen oder Gesellschaften des anderen Vertragsteils kontrolhert werden.

Moreover, enterprises which they control,
whether in the form of individual proprietorship, companies or otherwise, shall in all
that relates to the conduct of the activities
thereof, be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises
controlled by nationals or companies of
such other Party.

The provisions of article V are supplemented by the following
provisions of article V(5).
5. Den Staatsangeh6rigen und Gesellschaften des einen Vertragsteils wird in dem
Gebiet des anderen Vertragsteils hinsichtlich der in Absatz 2 und 4 dieses Artikels behandelten Angelegenheiten Inllnderbehandlung und Meistbeg~instigung
gewlhrt. AuBerdem wird Unternehmen, an
denen Staatsangeh6rige oder Gesellschaften des einen Vertragsteils in erheblichem
MaBe beteiligt sind, in dem Gebiet des
anderen Vertragsteils Inl~nderbehandlung
und Meistbeg(instigung in allen Angelegenheiten gewdhrt, die mit der Uberffihrung
eines Privatunternehmens in 6ffentliches
Eigentum oder seine Unterstellung unter
6ffentliche Aufsicht im Zusammenhang
stehen.

5. Nationals and companies of either
Party shall in no case be accorded, within
the territories of the other Party, less than
national treatment and most-favorednation treatment with respect to the matters set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
present Article. Moreover, enterprises in
which nationals or companies of either
Party have a substantial interest shall be
accorded, within the territories of the other
Party, not less than national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating to the taking of privately
owned enterprises into public ownership
and to the placing of such enterprises under
public control.
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The provisions of article VII are supplemented by the following
provision of article VII(4).
4. Den Staatsangeharigen und Gesellchaften jedes Vertragsteils sowie den von
ihnen kontrollierten Unternehmen wird
filr die in diesem Artikel behandelten Angelegenheiten mindestens Meistbeg(instigung gewAhrt.

B.

4. Nationals and companies of either
Party, as well as enterprises controlled by
such nationals or companies, shall in any
event be accorded most-favored-nation
treatment with reference to the matters
treated in the present Article.

Comparative Treaty Provisions

Similar provisions are to be found in other treaties between the
United States and third countries. The interpretation and application of the articles of the German-American Commercial Treaty
cited above in relation to the proposed Codetermination Bill
might, therefore, have repercussions on the interpretation and
application of other such treaties.
Conversely, recourse may be had to these other treaties in order
to interpret the German-American Commercial Treaty. It is, for
instance, relevant that the matter dealt within article V(3) of the
Commercial Treaty between the United States and the Federal
Republic is laid down in greater detail in the treaty between the
United States and Italy of September 26, 1951.
The nationals, corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party shall not be subjected to arbitrary or discriminatory
measures within the territories of the other High Contracting Party
resulting particularly in:
(a) preventing their effective control and management of enterprises
which they have been permitted to establish or acquire therein; or
(b) impairing their other legally acquired rights and interests in
such enterprises or in the investments which they have made,
whether in the form of funds (loans, shares or otherwise), materials,
equipment, services, processes, patents, techniques or otherwise.'
Numerous treaties, which the Federal Republic has concluded
with other states, contain further stipulations that by force of the
most-favored-nation clause of the German-American Commercial
Treaty9 become especially relevant to the relationship between the
Federal Republic and the United States. These treaties contain in
particular a more exact definition of the prohibition against expro8.

Treaty with Italy on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of Sept. 26,

1951, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685.
9.

German-American Commercial Treaty, arts. V(5), VIII(4).
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priation and other forms of encroachment on investments. The
treaty between the Federal Republic and Indonesia of November
8, 1968,10 for instance, contains the following provisions.
Artikel 1

Article 1

Im Sinne dieses Vertrages

For the purpose of this Agreement:

(1) umfaBt der Ausdruck "Kapitalanlagen" Verm6genswerte ieder Art, insbes6ndere, aber nicht ausschlieBlich,

(1) The term "investment" shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly, though not exclusively:

(a)

Eigentum an beweglichen und unheweolichen Sachen sowie sonstine dinglichte Rechte, wie Hypotheken, Pfandrechte, HieBhrauch und deroleichen;

a)

movable and immovable property as
well as any other rights in rem, such as
mortgage, lien pledge, usufruct and
similar rights;

b)

Anteilrechte an Gesellschaften und
andere Arten von Beteiligungen;

b)

shares of companies or other kinds of
interests;

(4) bezeichnet der Ausdruck "Gesellschaften"
a)

b)

in bezug auf die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland:

(4) The term "companies" shall mean:
a)

in respect of the Federal Republic of
Germany,

jede juristische Person sowie jede

any juridical person as well as any

Handelsgesellschaft oder sonstige
Gesellschaft oder Vereinigung mit
oder ohne Rechtspers6nlichkeit, die
ihren Sitz im Hoheitsgebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat und
nach den Gesetzeri zu Recht besteht,
gleichviel ob die Haftung ihrer Gesellschafter, Teilhaber oder Mitglieder be~chrankt oder unbeschrankt
und ob ihre Titigkeit auf Gewinn gerichtet ist oder nicht,

commercial company or other company or association with or without
legal personality, having its seat in the
territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany and lawfully existing consistent with legal provisions irrespective
of whether the liability of its partners,
associates or members is limited or
unlimited and whether or not its activities are directed at profit, and

in bezug auf die Republik Indonesien:
jede Gesellschaft mit beschrrnkter
Haftung, die im Hoheitsgebiet der
Republik Indonesien eingetragen ist,
sowie jede in bbereinstimmung mit
den Rechtsvorschriften der Republik
Indonesien gegrfindete juristische Person.

b)

in respect of the Republic of Indonesia, any company with a limited liability incorporated in the territory of
the Republic of Indonesia, or any juridical persons lawfully constituted in
accordance with its legislation.

10. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Indonesia of Nov.
8, 1968, [1970] BGBI. H 492.

CODETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY

Winter 19761

Artikel 2

Article 2

(1) Jede Vertragspartei wird in ihrem
Hoheitsgebiet Kapitalanlagen von Staatsangeh6rigen oder Gesellschaften der anderen Vertragspartei nach Moglichkeit f6rdern und diese Kapitalanlagen in Ubereinstimmung mit ihren Rechtsvorschriften
und Verwaltungsverfahren zulassen. Sie
wird diese Kapitalanlagen in jedem Fall
gerecht und billig behandeln.

(1) Each Contracting Party shall in its
territory promote as far as possible the investment of capital by nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party and
admit such investments in accordance with
its legislation and administrative practice.
It shall in any case accord such investment
fair and equitable treatment.

(2) Kapitalanlagen, die in Ubereinstimmung mit den Rechtsvorschriften
einer Vertragspartei im Anwendungs-

(2) Investments made in accordance
with the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party within the area of applica-

bereich ihrer Rechtsordnung von Staatsan-

tion of that Party's legal system by nationals or companies of the other Contracting

gehbrigen oder Gesellschaften der anderen
Vertragspartei vorgenommen worden sind,
genieBen den vollen Schutz dieses Vertrages. Soweit fir die Vornahme der Kapitalanlage ein Zulassungsverfahren erforderlich ist, genieBt die betreffende Kapitalanlage diesen Schutz mit Wirkung yom
Datum der Zulassung.

Party, shall enjoy the full protection of the
present Agreement. To the extent that an
admission procedure is required for making
an investment, such investment shall enjoy
this protection as from the date of the
granting of the admission.

Artikel 3

Article 3

(1) Kapitalanlagen von Staatsangeh6rigen oder Gesellschaften einer Vertragspartei genieBen im Hoheitsgebiet der anderen Vertragspartei vollen Schutz und
Sicherheit.

(1) Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy
full protection as well as security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.

(2) Kapitalanlagen von Staatsangeh6rigen oder Gesellschaften einer Vertragspartei dtirfen im Hoheitsgebiet der anderen Vertragapartei nur zum allgemeinen
Wohl und gegen Entschddigung enteignet
werden. Die Entschidigung muB dem
Wert der enteigneten Kapitalanlage entsprechen, tats~chlich verwerbtbar und frei
transferierbar sein sowie uiiverzriglich geleistet warden. Sprtestens im Zeitpunkt der
Enteignung muB in geeigneter Weise ffir
die Festsetzung und Leistung der Entschfdigung Vorsorge getroffen sein. Die
Rechtm&Bigkeit der Enteignung und die
H6he derEntischadigung mtissen in einem
ordentlichen Rechtsverfahren nachgeprdft
werden k6nnen.

(2) Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not
be expropriated in the territory of the other
Contracting Party except for the public
benefit and against compensation. Such
compensation shall represent the equivalent of the investment expropriated; it shall
be actually realizable, freely transferable,
and shall be made without undue delay.
Provision shall have been made in an appropriate manner at or prior to the time of
expropriation for the determination and
the giving of such compensation. The legality of any such expropriation and the
amount of compensation shall be subject to
review by due process of law.

Artikel 9

Article 9

(2) Abgesehen von den Bestimmungen
in Number 6 Buchstab b des beiliegenden

(2) Except for the stipulations made in
No. 6(b) of the Protocol annexed hereto

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
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Protokolls behandelt jede Vertragspartei in
ihrem Hoheitsgebiet Staatsangeh6rige oder
Gesellschaften der anderen Vertragspartei
hinschtlich ihrer Bettitigung im Zusammenhang mit Kapitalanlagen nicht weniger gfinstig als ibre eigenen Staatsangeh6rigen und Gesellschaften dritter Staaten.
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neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the
other Contracting Party, as regards their
activity in connexion with investments, to
treatment less favorable than it accords to
its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any third State.

Protocol:
(3) Zu Artikel 3:
Die Bestimmungen des Artikels 3
Absatz 2 gelten auch ffir die dberf~ihrung einer Kapitalanlage in 6ffentliches Eigentum, ihre Unterstellung
unter 6ffentliche Aufsicht oder lhnliche Eingriffe der 6ffentlichen Hand.
Unter Enteignung ist die Entziehung
oder Beschrtnkung jedes Verm6gensrechts zu verstehen, das allein oder
susammen mit anderen Rechten eine
Kapitalanlage bildet.
(6)

Zu Artikel 9:
a)

Als Bestatigung im Sinne des
Artikels 9 Absastz 2 gilt insbesondere, aber nicht susschlieBlich, die Verwaltung, die Verwendung, der Gebrauch und die
Nutzung einer Kapitalanlage.

(3) Ad Article 3:
The provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 3 shall also apply to the transfer
of an investment to public ownership,
to the subjection of an investment to
public control, or to similar interventions by public authorities. Expropriation shall mean the taking away or
restricting of any property right which
in itself or in conjunction with other
rights constitutes an investment.
(6) Ad Article 9:
a)

The following shall more particularly, though not exclusively, be
deemed "activity" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
9: the management, maintenance, use and enjoyment of an
investment.

Similar provisions are to be found in numerous treaties with other

countries."
It must be noted that all these treaties of the Federal Republic,
which prevent an encroachment on rights based on investment,
refer not only to German investments in third countries but expressly apply, on the basis of reciprocity, to investments of the
nationals of these countries in the Federal Republic. For instance,
paragraph 2 of the preamble of the Treaty with Indonesia provides:
In dem Bestreben, giinstige Bedingungen
fMir Kapitalanlagen von Staatsagenh6rigen
oder Gesellschaften des einen Staates im
Hoheitsgebiet des anderen Staates zu
schaffen ....

Intending to create favourable conditions
for investments by nationals and companies of either State in the territory of the
other State. ...

By means of the most-favored-nation clause contained in the
German-American Commercial Treaty, American investors in the
11.

See Appendix 2.
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Federal Republic can thus invoke all provisions referring to the
protection of investments of third-country nationals in the Federal
Republic. 12
C. ShareholderProperty Rights
If the treaty provisions set out above speak of property, companies, shares, control and management, they presupposeirrespective of the fact that details of the legal rules may differ
from country to country-that the contracting parties are in
agreement on the notions of the legal institutions referred to and
that the basic conceptions of these institutions are the same under

the national laws of the contracting parties. As a matter of fact,
the basic concepts of property and the rights of shareholders coincide in the legal systems of the Federal Republic and the United
States as well as in those countries with which the Federal Republic has concluded treaties for the protection of investments.
If someone invests capital in the form of money or other property
into a company endowed with legal personality, the investor himself loses the legal title to his original investment. On the other
hand, the joint stock company as a juridical person enjoys the
same rights over property and funds resulting from shareholders'
investments (or otherwise acquired) as does a natural person with
respect to his property. As a juridical person the company exercises
its own property rights by means of the same organ that is empowered to make legal commitments on behalf of the company. The
conclusion of all sorts of legal contracts, etc., on behalf of the
company and the administration of the property of the company
are together customarily designated as "management."
The shareholders have only an indirect legal interest in the property of the joint stock company. A shareholder, however, by means
of contributing part of the initial capital of the company (or by
purchase of a share) acquires the rights of an associate (a member)
as defined by the law of the state in which the company is incorporated and the by-laws of the joint stock company in question.
These shareholder rights are to be exercised in part individually,

in part collectively. The right to receive declared dividends is the
12. British business, referring to the most-favored-nation clause in BritishJapanese treaties, has required that the stipulations of the American-Japanese
Commercial Treaty concerning equal treatment of American investments in
Japan with Japanese investments be applied to British investors too. See D.
HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN

273 (1973).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

12

[VOL 9: 1

most important right of the first category. Among those rights
exercised collectively, the most important are the rights to participate personally in the shareholders meetings and to vote on questions for which the shareholders meeting is competent, especially
the election of other organs of the joint stock company. German
law in this respect has been defined by the Federal Constitutional
Court as follows: "A share is both a property right and a membership right. It is property administered under the laws governing
right cannot be
corporations . . . Its character as a property
13
separated from that of a membership right.

In the last analysis, the right to participate in the shareholders
meeting and the right to draw dividends and a potential share of
the liquidation proceeds in case of dissolution constitute a surrogate of the property that the shareholder has given to the company.
Property rights of an individual comprise the right not only to the
enjoyment of his property but also the right to determine how his
property is to be used in order to be productive and the right freely
to designate another person who, as administrator, has the authority and task to manage the property in the interests of the owner.
Thus, the right of the shareholder comprises not only the right to
collect dividends but also the right to designate, together with
other shareholders, those persons who are to determine how the
property of the joint stock company created by the investment of
the shareholders is to be administered and utilized for the benefit
of the company. The fact that small shareholders often do not
exercise their right to take part in the shareholders meeting, and
the fact that even when they participate in such elections their
influence is minimal in comparison with the large shareholders
does not alter the fact that under both German and American
corporate law, an essential aspect of the rights of shareholders
remains the privilege to participate in the collective designation of
the organs of the company.
The voting right of the shareholder in the shareholders meeting
is itself a property right, because it safeguards his property interests:
[T]he right to vote is a right which is inherent in and incidental to
the ownership of corporate stock, and as such is a property right,
and it follows that the stockholder cannot be deprived of it, and that
the right cannot be essentially impaired, either by the legislature or
by the corporation, without his consent, through amending the
13.

Judgment of May 7, 1969, 25 BVerfG 372, 407.
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charter, or by by-law. This is equally true though he is given what
others might regard as a better right by way of a substitute. The
legislature cannot indirectly impair such rights by authorizing the
directors, with the consent of only a majority of the stockholders, to
4
so amend the charter as to have that effect.1
Without prejudice to those special measures that protect minority shareholders, an ubiquitous aspect of a joint stock company is
that the ownership of a majority of the shares enables the holder
(or a group of allied shareholders) rightfully to exercise what is
usually'5 called "control" of the joint stock company. Control of

the company means control of the management functions exercised by the competent organs of the company; such control by
shareholders is exercised principally through their right to elect the
organs of the company or to recall their officers through new elections. 6 As an incident of the voting rights of the individual shareholder, the right to exercise such control constitutes a property
right. Therefore, one refers to the higher price required for the
purchase of a controlling plurality of shares as to the price for the
"purchase of control."
As previously noted, under German law governing joint stock
companies, the supervisory board is the most important managing
organ of the company. Even under the old Labor Management
Relations Act, which provides that one-third of the members of the
supervisory board are to be elected by the company's work force,
a "domination" of the supervisory board and thus full control of
the management of the company under any and all circumstances
is presently possible if one shareholder owns five-sixths of the outstanding shares or if five-sixths of the shareholders agree on the
same policy. Independent of this control through voting power,
especially with reference to the selection of the majority of the
supervisory board, German law provides for the possibility that
through the conclusion of a "domination contract" a joint stock
14.

W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §

2025

(1931-1933).
15. E.g., German-American Commercial Treaty, art. V.

16.

"In the narrowest legal sense, control should mean possession of enough

voting shares to elect a majority of the board of directors." A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS
& S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1063 (1972). "The law has always recog-

nized the right of majority stockholders of a corporation to control its business
and affairs, and a court of equity will never interfere with such control except for
the very best of reasons." Gaines v. Gaines Bros. Co., 176 Okla. 583, 588, 56 P.2d
863, 868 (1936).
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company and its organs can be required to follow the instructions
of the organs of another company that owns all or almost all the
shares of the dominated company."

To the extent that majority decisions of the shareholders at the
shareholders meeting, or decisions by other organs of the company,
can change the by-laws of a joint stock company, both American

and German law severely restrict the possibilities of encroachment
upon the voting rights that are by law attached to share ownership,
notwithstanding the fact that by investing in the joint stock company the individual shareholders submitted to majority decisions
of the company organs, which are competent to promulgate or to
change the by-laws of the company.
Decades ago, American courts declared invalid amendments to
a company's articles of incorporation providing that the legal voting rights of the shareholders should not generally be exercised by
themselves but rather by others. The issue of "voting trusts" created by articles of incorporation was treated as follows by a decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1913:
Independent of any constitutional or statutory provision, in the absence of the consent of such stockholders such a provision cannot be
upheld. The right to control one's own property is inherent; and
while the courts have upheld voting trusts and pooling arrangements by stockholders where they are made with full knowledge of
all the conditions, and are designed to effectuate some common
purpose for the common good and have been voluntarily entered
into, we are aware of no instance where individual rights have been
so far abridged as to hold that a stockholder's shares may without
his consent be placed in such a trust, either by a charter provision
or otherwise, and be deprived completely of their control, even upon
the ground that it was for his own as well as for the general good. It
is well grounded in our fundamental law that there is no limitation
upon one's right to control that which is his own, except such restrictions as might be imposed by the law of the land. Any other rules
would be subversive of that individual responsibility which is the
keynote of all civilization and progress. To say that appellants may
without the consent of the poolers have inserted in the articles of
incorporation a clause taking from the poolers the right to control
that which is theirs, and place its control absolutely in their own
hands, would be to recognize a most unwarranted assumption of

authority. There is no more sacred duty confided to the courts than
the upholding of individual rights in property, and no considerations
17.

See AktG §§ 291, 308.
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of temporary advantage which it is thought might accrue to the
growers generally will justify them in departing from the well beaten
paths so clearly defined in all English and American jurisprudence. 8
Unless special statutory provisions make it possible for the articles of incorporation of an American company to provide for the
nomination of directors by creditors or employees, 9 such provisions are inadmissible under American corporate law.
The holders of bonds of a corporation or other creditors cannot be
given the right to vote at corporate meetings for the election of
directors, or on the other questions, either by a by-law of the corporation or by contract, even with the consent of all the stockholders,
where this is inconsistent with or contrary to express provisions of
the charter or statutes."
On the other hand, no provision of American law prevents the
management of a corporation from freely contracting with creditors or employees, including trade unions, to inform or consult
them before certain decisions may be taken.
According to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
articles of incorporation of a joint stock company adopted by a
majority of the founding shareholders may provide an "upper
limit" on the voting rights of an individual shareholder holding
several shares."' However, neither the by-laws of the company nor
the majority of shareholders at the shareholders meeting necessary
to change the by-laws may grant to persons other than the shareholders the right to select members of the supervisory board and
thus to weaken the shareholders voting rights at the general shareholders meeting."2 Thus, under present law the shareholders meet18. Lebus v. Standifer, 154 Ky. 444, 157 S.W. 727 (1913). All the stockholders
of the corporation in question were tobacco growers who earlier had set up a pool
to handle the sale of their tobacco growers who earlier had set up a pool to handle
the sale of their tobacco for all of them. The amended charter provided that the
power to vote the corporate stock should not be vested in the stockholders but in
officers of the sales pool corporation.
19. For some time company acts of some states permitted the by-laws of
corporations to provide for creditors or company employees to nominate some
members of the boards of directors. See Blumberg, Reflections on Proposalsfor
CorporateReform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors:
"Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 BOSTON U.L. REV. 547, 553 n.17
(1973).
20. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2043
(1931-1933).
21. AktG § 134.
22. AktG § 101.

16

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:1

ing could not grant to the company's work force additional rights
to name members of the supervisory board in addition to those
they elect under the existing Labor Management Relations Act.2
Again, the by-laws may grant to certain individual shareholders or
a group of shareholders the prerogative to designate a fixed number
of persons to the supervisory board distinct from those that are
elected in the general shareholders meeting; these are included
within the two-thirds of the members of the supervisory board
elected by the shareholders.24 But there is common agreement that
no change in the by-laws may partially or totally remove this special right of delegation without the consent of those shareholders
to whom it was originally granted; nor can this be done by changing the by-laws specifying the total number of members of the
supervisory board.2 Such a procedure would amount to expropriation of the special rights of certain shareholders duly granted in the
by-laws. Under no circumstances can the by-laws deprive the
shareholders of their normal voting right or stipulate that this
voting right may only be exercised with the consent of others.
In American corporation law the right of the shareholder, together with other shareholders, to elect the top organs of management is considered to be an integral part of the property rights of
the shareholder. Therefore, not even the legislature may transfer

this right directly or indirectly to others or restrict it against the
will of the owner.
Shares of stock in a corporation constitute proprietary rights. They
represent the proportion to which the respective shareholders are
severally entitled in the distribution of the profits arising from the
corporate business, and in the final distribution of the estate of the
corporation, if it should cease to exist . . . . The right of voting
stock at corporate meetings is an incident of ownership; it is a part
of the stockholder's property inherent in him by virtue of his title
... . The holders of the majority of the shares of a corporation have
the right and the power, by the election of directors and by the vote
of their stock, to determine the policy of their corporation and to
manage and control its action . . . . The right to vote for directors
is a right to protect property from loss, and to make its possession
23. Meyer-Landrut, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR § 101 notes 9, 10
(C.H. Barz, et al. eds. 3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as AKTIENGESETZ:
GnoSSKOMMETAR];

H.

WUERDINGER, AKTIEN- UND KONZERNRECHT

24. See note 3 supra.
25. Meyer-Landrut, in 1(2)
101, note 13.

122 (1973).

AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note

23, §
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beneficial. To deprive a stockholder of his right to vote is to deprive
him of an essential attribute of his property."
Under German company law, too, the voting rights and election
rights of the shareholders at their general meeting are the most
important means at the disposal of the shareholders to ensure that
the other organs of the joint stock company fulfill their duties in
the way the shareholders consider proper. In German law, shareholders have only very restricted claims for damages against the
members of the executive board and supervisory board,27 quite

apart from the fact that particularly high claims for damages
against individual members of either board could not de facto be
collected. In contrast to American corporate law, under German
law a suit by the shareholders' general meeting or by an individual
shareholder to compel the executive board or supervisory board to
take a certain measure required for the good of the company, or to
abstain from a given action that would be detrimental, is possible
only in truly exceptional cases. The real protection of the shareholders against the executive board and supervisory board exercising their powers in a way detrimental to the company, and, thus,
indirectly detrimental to the shareholders, lies in their ability,
through the shareholders meeting, to elect such persons to the
supervisory board as may be expected to fulfill their trust vis-avis the company.
"The shareholders can safeguard their interests as members of
the corporation only by means of such remedies as are provided for
by the legal rules on joint stock companies. '2 8 This is done by
exercising their voting rights and by claims for damages allowable
within the applicable provisions of the act on joint stock companies.2 Thus, under German law too, the right to elect the members
of the supervisory board is the decisive means to prevent the organs of management from damaging the interests of the shareholders with respect to the application of income and to the preservation of the property of the joint stock company.
If a shareholder has a sufficient number of shares to insure "control," the controlling right resulting from his voting rights is an

inseparable part of the rights evolving from his shares:
26. Fein v. Lanston Monotype Mach. Co., 196 Va. 753, 85 S.E.2d 353 (1955).
27. AktG §§ 93, 116, 117,
2, 47.
28. Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, § 93,
note 41.
29. AktG §§ 117, 147.
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The power to control the management of a corporation, that is, to
elect directors to manage its affairs, is an inseparable incident of the
ownership of a majority of its stock, or sometimes. . . to the ownership of enough shares, less than a majority, to control an election."
D.

Parity Codetermination under InternationalTreaty Law

As property in the wider sense, the voting rights of the individual
shareholder and the position resulting from the ownership of sufficient shares to ensure control are protected both against total expropriation and against partial expropriation or encroachments
under the international treaties protecting investments.
According to article 1 of the above mentioned Treaty between
the Federal Republic and Indonesia, shares constitute an "invest-

ment" within the meaning of the Treaty." The voting and election
rights connected with shares are protected against expropriation
and restriction by the additional protocol to article 3, because
together with the other rights of a shareholder, the voting right is
to be regarded itself as an investment.
Both the German-American Commercial Treaty and those conventions between the Federal Republic and third countries relating
to the protection of investments, which may be invoked by United
States citizens because of the most-favored-nation clause, presuppose that an investment protected by treaty has been made in
conformity with the law of the host country. Once an investment
has been legally made, the treaties do not prevent one of the contracting parties from changing its regulations governing future investments; however, a new law cannot retroactively invalidate investments which have taken place under laws hitherto valid.
Under the German-American Commercial Treaty it would, therefore, be permissible to apply the proposed Codetermination Bill to
future investments of Americans in the Federal Republic. No
objections have ever been voiced by Americans when investments
made after the Treaty came into force in 1954 were subjected to
the regulations of the Labor Management Relations Act of October
11, 1952. Nor do the treaties prevent one of the contracting parties
from modifying its trade and labor laws and applying them to past

investments made by members of other contracting states. The
treaties, however, do prohibit the transfer of property rights of
American nationals acquired in the form of shares through legiti30. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
31. See Part H(B) supra.
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mate investments in the Federal Republic, when the transfer is
against the investors' will, whether it is to the state or to another
person and whether by legislation or by other sovereign acts. Similarly, the treaties expressly prohibit the retroactive restriction of
the rights defined as investment through ex post facto laws passed
32
by the host country.
If the rights of the shareholder imply the possibility of indirectly
exercising a decisive influence on the management of the company
(especially on the use of the property of the company) by choosing
the members of the organs of the company, and if under the law
in force in the host country at the time of the investment a majority of foreign shareholders is guaranteed the opportunity to "control" the joint stock company, then a restriction of such control
through later laws is irreconcilable with the treaties."
The corporate law of the host country may, under the treaties,
provide for the issue and acquisition of shares that do not carry
voting rights, or a right to participate in the election of the members of the company organs. If, however, according to the corporate
law in force at the time of the investment, such rights are tied to
the share, it would be an expropriation within the meaning of the
treaties cited were the voting or election right of the shareholder
transferred by law to the state or to other shareholders or to third
parties. It would also be expropriation within the meaning of the
treaties were a law to specify that the shareholder must allow his
voting and election rights to be exercised by someone whom he
cannot freely designate, but who is imposed on him. It follows that
within the meaning of the treaties it would be partial expropriation
of the shareholders with hitherto exclusive voting rights were new
voting and election rights created for persons other than those with
whom the investor had to reckon at the time of his investment.
Since section 118 of the Act on Joint Stock Companies of the
Federal Republic states expressly that the shareholders exercise

"their rights in matters of the company" within the shareholders

32. See, e.g., the Protocol to article III of the Treaty with Indonesia, quoted
in Part II(B) supra.
33. German investments abroad can be insured in the Federal Republic
against expropriation and "encroachment amounting to expropriation" with payment of indemnities by the federal budget. According to the general regulations

of the Ministry of Economics, it is a condition for such insurance that the
investment be endowed with voting and control rights; no insurance shall be given
"if 50% or more of the capital or the voting rights are in foreign hands." Ha
HANDBUCH DER ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE

62,

INSTALLMENT

11.
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meeting, it would constitute a restriction on the rights of each
individual shareholder if a retroactive law changed the rights of the
shareholders to elect the members of the supervisory board in favor
of other persons, in particular the company's work force.
The explanatory preamble to the Codetermination Bill states
that this sort of legislation is important "for the maintenance and
extension of the democratic order of society of the Federal Republic." This goal is not alone sufficient to justify the claim that the
partial expropriation of the voting right of the shareholders is a
measure taken "in the public interest." At any rate, the draft law
does not provide for any compensation for the loss in value of the
investment resulting from the introduction of parity codetermination.
The following example illustrates how the diminution of the
voting power of those shareholders who by virtue of ownership of
a majority of the shares hold legal control of the company constitutes an expropriationwithin the meaning of the treaties. In some
Algerian oil companies, Algerian and French shareholders each
contributed 50 per cent of the capital. In 1971, an Algerian legisla-

tive enactment34 transferred only two per cent of the French capital
to the Algerian shareholder to establish Algerian control over the
company. The legislative act expressly called this action "nationalization." The same effect could have been achieved had an Algerian law given to the state, or to the Algerian shareholder, or to a
third party subject to the influence of this shareholder, simply one
additional voting right in the organs of the company. Such a measure could also clearly have been an expropriation of the controlling voting power of the French shareholder.
llI.

PARITY CODETERMINATION UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

The treaties' prohibition of restrictions of the voting power of
foreign investors, especially restrictions that impair the influence
of the shareholders over the use of the property of the joint stock
company, conforms to the requirements of general international
law (at least as it is interpreted in the United States) independent
of the existence of the treaties themselves. The findings of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, as
discussed below, show clearly that an expropriation in violation of
34. Ord. No. 71/11 of Feb. 24, 1971, art. 1,
MATERIALS 851 (1971).

3, translated in 10 INT'L LEGAL
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international law can occur not only when property rights of foreigners are openly transferred by action of the State from the
owner to another person; expropriation can also consist of withdrawing or curtailing what is generally designated as the right of
management, or control of the property and/or company.
In conformity with international law, the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, 3 establishing the Commission, specified,
on the basis of United States treaties with Yugoslavia and other
East European countries, that American nationals should be compensated in full not only for the seizure of real estate and other
movable and immovable property but also for the deprivation of
"rights and interests in and with respect to property" in these
countries.
According to the decisions of the Settlement Commission, "taking of property" includes restrictions imposed on the owner which
result in his no longer having "control and management" of his
property or other rights. As early as 1954, a decision under the
Yugoslav Claims Agreement 3 stated that "taking of property"
also takes place if the legal title formally remains with the claim-

ant.37 All acts depriving the owner of the right to administer or
dispose of the property as well as depriving him of the enjoyment
of the property or rendering this enjoyment de facto impossible
constitute a "taking" of property. The Settlement Commission
considered it decisive that "the property [had] been under the
control and management of organs of the Yugoslav Government,"
although no formal act of state had taken place in the particular
case.
In a later decision, the Commission stated:
It is clear that the claimant is precluded from the free and unrestricted use of his property and that the fact that record title...
has not been transferred to the State is of little moment ....
Claimant's property has been "taken" ....
When Czechoslovakian law imposed restrictions on the owners
35. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 162 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1949 Settlement Act].
36. Agreement with Yugoslavia on United States Pecuniary Claims, July 19,
1948, 64 Stat. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 1803.
37. Claim of Michael and Nick Zuzich, Dec. No. 1196, Nov. 24, 1954, cited in
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N AND ITS PREDECESSORs FROM SEPT. 14, 1949 TO MARCH 31, 1955 at 161.
38. Claim of Albert Bela Reet, 10 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 61 (1959).
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of apartment houses, the Commission ruled that certain American
real estate owners
were and are precluded from the free and unrestricted use of their
realty and the fruits of such realty. .

.

. Owners of such property,

despite the fact that they have remained the record owners, lost all
control over the property and were little more than collecting agents
for the Czechoslovakian Government . . .39
As a result, the Commission considered the property of these
American nationals as "constructively taken."
Dealing with measures against American nationals in Cuba, the
report of the House of Representatives on Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act states:
No special measures by the Castro government directed against the
property of nationals of the United States are needed to show nationalization or confiscation when it is evident that a Cuban corporation owned by United States nationals is deprived of its management and assets by or with the concurrence of the Castro government. 0
This line of reasoning was applied in a decision involving Cuba.
Two companies created in Cuba under local law were whollyowned by an American company. The Cuban companies were neither formally expropriated nor were they "otherwise taken by any
. . . other single official or formal action of the Government of
Cuba. .

.

... Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that various

laws, regulations, etc., of the Castro regime concerning control of
shipping, transfer of foreign exchange, free disposal of bank accounts, hiring and firing of workers, and the like effectively precluded operation and control by the parent company and therefore
constituted a "constructive taking":
[a]s a direct result of these various measures claimant was completely deprived of dominion and control over its two Cuban subsidiaries. Moreover, the subsidiaries were compelled to continue operations despite these adverse conditions which resulted in progressively reduced profits and a steady depletion of the subsidiaries'
39. Claim of Alexander Feigler, 15 FCSC SEMIANN.
40.

REP.

16 (1961).

H.R. REP. No. 706, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1966).

41. Claim of Garcia & Diaz, Inc., [1970] FCSC ANN. REP. 30.
42. 13 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 16, 18 (1960).
43. Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 194 N.Y. 212, 226, 87 N.E. 443,
448 (1909).

Winter 1976]

CODETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY

assets. . .. The Commission holds that the actions of the Government of Cuba with respect to the two subsidiaries, which were engaged in the maritime industry, constituted a constructive taking of
the two subsidiaries .... 1,
This decision is particularly relevant since codetermination by
persons other than the shareholders, as planned in the Federal
Republic, may also result in a situation in which the joint stock
company is no longer administered with a view toward earning a
profit for the shareholders, but with a view toward operating at a
loss to preserve jobs or to induce the shareholders to sell their
shares for a minimal price.
In Czechoslovakia, the agricultural cooperatives were assigned
land which "in the view of the local peoples' committees had not
been propertly cultivated;" in many cases this included land
owned by United States nationals. Under laws passed in 1948-49,
the organs of these cooperatives included persons who were not
members of the cooperative, but in fact were predominantly government employees and members of the Communist Party. The

Settlement Commission concluded that the inclusion of landed
property owned by United States nationals in such cooperatives
constituted a "constructive taking":
It is obvious that the transfer of land by members to the cooperative
virtually amounts to a deprivation of the right of the owner to dispose of the property and to employ the benefits thereof."
The United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission can
act only when, as a result of foreign government measures, a complete loss of property rights of American nationals has taken place
and when compensation has been demanded on those grounds.
The Commission cannot hear appeals to prevent encroachment on
the property rights of American nationals or to have such encroachment stopped. But the reasoning of the Commission shows
clearly that restrictions on property rights per se-even when no
actual damage has yet been caused and no certain amount is calculable for an indemnity-were considered as an interference with
the rights of American nationals in violation of international law.
IV.

CODETERMINATION AND THE DUTIES OF DiREcTORS

Decisions of United States courts have made clear that the vot44. E.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). See also
Blumberg, Reflections on Proposalsfor CorporateReform Through Change in the
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ing right which the individual shareholder has acquired together
with his share cannot be encroached upon even by legislative or
other action taken with the consent of the majority of shareholders,
since this would constitute an expropriation of property without
compensation. Even the express reservation by the legislature that
general corporate law or a charter incorporating a particular company is subject to later change does not justify the violation of the
voting right as an acquired property right. The decisions have
clearly brought out that the voting right of the individual shareholder is a property right protected against encroachment by the
legislature. As early as 1909 the Court of Appeals of New York
ruled:
The stockholders of a corporation, as such, have no direct power of
management, and even by united action they can neither bind nor
loose the company by making contracts or controlling investments.
The capital stock owned by them is property. It represents an investment upon which they are entitled to dividends, provided they
are earned, and whether they can be earned or not depends on the
management. Indeed, the safety of the entire investment depends
on the power to manage the corporate business, because, even in the
case of the defendant, with its immense surplus, careless and improvident management might impair the value of the stock or utterly destroy it. The right to vote for directors therefore is the right
to protect property from loss and make it effective in earning dividends. In other words, it is the right which gives the property value
and is part of the property itself, for it cannot be separated therefrom. Unless the stockholder can protect his investment in this way
he cannot protect it at all, and his property might be wasted by
feeble administration, and he could not prevent it. He might see the
value of all he possessed fading away, yet he would have no power,
direct or indirect, to save himself or the company from financial
downfall. With the right to vote, as we may assume, his property is
safe and valuable. Without that right, as we may further assume,
his property is not safe and may become of no value. To absolutely
deprive him of the right to vote therefore is to deprive him of an
essential attribute of his property. To so undermine that right as to
essentially affect its power of protection would, under ordinary circumstances, undermine the right to property involved in the ownership of stock. .

.

. These are general rules, and under "ordinary

circumstances" therefore the Legislature could not by direct action
essentially impair the right of the plaintiff to vote as a stockholder,
nor could it do so indirectly, by authorizing the directors, with the
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consent of only a majority of the stockholders, to so amend the
charter as to have that effect. 3
Only if (as happens with life insurance companies) the charter
creating a corporation already envisaged the possibility of a majority of shareholders deciding to transform the right of certain creditors into claims to the profits of the company together with a right
to vote for directors, may subsequent legislation changeaccording to the decision just cited-the modalitiesfor so curtailing the voting power of the original shareholders.
The question may be posed, therefore, whether under the law of
the Federal Republic of Germany the introduction of parity codetermination in the supervisory board is not perhaps simply a new
modality of restrictions such as German corporate law already
imposes on the rights of shareholders. It is argued by some people
that indeed under the laws of the Federal Republic the shareholders have no right to claim that the executive board and supervisory
board should be guided primarily by the interests of the shareholders, whether expressed unanimously or by a majority. Thus, it is
further argued, that the shareholders do not have an acquired right
to exercise a decisive influence by voting on the composition of the
supervisory board. This argument must be closely examined since
in the United States, too, it has been said that the organs of management of a corporation need not be guided solely by the interests
44
of the shareholders.
The control of the management of a corporation by the majority
of shareholders, as guaranteed by their voting power, is certainly
not altogether without limits either under German or American
law. Irrespective of whether a joint stock company is controlled by
a certain group of shareholders, its management organs are neither
completely free in the exercise of their powers nor are they unconditionally subject to the instructions of controlling shareholders.
Under American company law, directors are said to be in the
position of trustees in relation to the shareholders.4 While German
company law does not know the juridical concept of the "trust" in
Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors,
53 BOSTON U.L. REv. 547, 553 n.17 (1973).
45. See Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1931); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 66 (Rev. ed. 1946); H.
HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970). For court decisions see
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
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the sense that American law does, under German law the so-called
duty of the executive board and supervisory board "to use proper
care" (Sorgfaltspflicht) when fulfilling their functions" is also designated as a Treupflicht-a duty to loyally defend another person's
interest."
In German legal literature there is unanimous agreement that
such loyalty is owed to the company and nobody else. Rather vague
references imply that the duty of the executive board and the
supervisory board to use proper care means not only safeguarding
the interests of the company, but also includes safeguarding the
interests of the individual shareholders, of the work force, and of
the common weal.4"
Such thoughts are not alien to American law either, where recently it has been suggested that the organs of a private corporation should carry out management functions with "social responsibility."49 American legal literature, however, clearly distinguishes
between social responsibilities that can be legally enforced and
what are called "voluntary acts of corporate conscience." The social responsibilities enforceable under public law turn out to be
nothing other than the obligation to abide by legislative requirements designed to protect the public interest when it differs from
the interests of the shareholders:
Corporate social duties are those that the state enforces directly by
the criminal law, or indirectly by allowing private citizens to bring
suits in its courts to force compliance or to punish noncompliance. 0

Currently, however, the basic principle governing the actions of
the organs of an American corporation remains the precept expressed in the famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. :"'
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. This discretion of directors is to be exercised in
46. AktG §§ 93, 116.

47. Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, § 93,
notes 9, 10; Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESsTZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR § 84, notes 11, 12
(W. Gadow, et al. eds. 2d ed. 1961).

48. Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETz: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, § 93,
note 10.
49. E.g., Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
50. Comment, Herald Co. v. Seawell, A New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1162 (1973).
51. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes."
This concept was elaborated in a famous article by Adolf A.
Berle as follows:
[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as
their interest appears. . . . In consequence, the use of the power is
subject to equitable limitation when the power has been exercised
to the detriment of such interest, however absolute the grant of
power may be in terms, and however correct the technical exercise
of it may have been.53
The situation is no different with respect to German company
law as it was and is in force until today. Even though it is said that
company organs must be loyal to the company, it is still true that
in the last analysis the company is nothing other than the union
of the shareholders endowed with a separate legal personality.
Under German law the duty of the executive board and supervisory
board "to be loyal" means that these organs may under no circumstances exercise their powers to satisfy their own interests at the
expense of the interests of the shareholders. The company organs
have a duty also in the execution of their management functions
to respect legally valid claims of third parties against the company,
and neither the general shareholders meeting nor individual shareholders may prevent such action. The faithful execution of contracts concluded on behalf of the company with sellers and buyers,
creditors, etc., is, again, their duty as conscientious managers.
Similarly, the duty to respect the common weal, which is said to
be subsumed in the general duty of the executive board and supervisory board to use proper care, consists of nothing other than
obeying the laws that have been passed in the interests of the
general public. 4
52. 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
53. Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HAiv. L. REv. 1049 (1931).
54. This is underlined by the fact that the executive board of a joint stock
company cannot be held liable for the violation of its duty of loyalty "with respect
to the company" if in accordance with § 119, 2 of the Act on Joint Stock
Companies, it has called a general meeting of the shareholders and then acted
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Similarly, consideration of the interests of the work force essentially comprises, under present German law, adherence to all legal
and contractual requirements relating to the company's work
force. Furthermore, the organs of the company can and should
confer "voluntary" benefits to the workers, provided that such
legally voluntary concessions indirectly serve the good of the company, especially by maintaining or promoting goodwill and a
peaceful working climate in the plant. 5 The welfare of the company, which in the last analysis alone is relevant, is always identi-

cal with the interests of the shareholders to the extent that it aims,
under all circumstances, at the conservation of the capital, viz. the
investment of the shareholders, and the realization of a profit com-

mensurate to the size of the capital.
This proposition is confirmed if one examines the result under
German law when the executive board or supervisory board violates their duty "to use proper care." Generally only the company
by vote of the shareholders meeting (or possibly by a minority of
the shareholders but only under very special circumstances by
individual shareholders or creditors who have been injured) may
raise claims for restitution of damage done to the company-claims, that is, against the members of those organs of the
company that have violated their duty to use proper care 6 If a
on the majority decision of this meeting. See also AktG § 93, 4; Meyer-Landrut,
in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, § 93, 4.
In German as in American corporate law, court decisions focus on the proper
conduct of the organs of a corporation as loyal servants of the company, if a
majority of the shareholders-especially those who through their right to elect the
organs of the company exercise "control" over it-have desires with respect to the
activity of the company and the utilization of its capital differing from those of a
minority. Detailed provisions of both German and American law guarantee minority shareholders certain minimum rights vis-a-vis the majority. These minimum rights cannot be taken from them by the organs of the company acting in
accordance with the desires of the majority of shareholders. American corporate
law offers the minority shareholders various possibilities of court action. In the
Federal Republic, not only the company organs themselves but the majority
shareholders who influence them can be held liable for damages if the legally
protected interests of the minority are violated by the company organs acting on
behalf of the controlling majority. An abuse by the majority of its voting rights
in the general shareholders meeting provides the minority with the opportunity
to challenge the decisions of the general shareholders meeting in court. AktG §
243.
55. Meyer-Landrut, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, §

76, note 9,
56. Id. at note 12.
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decision taken by the executive board has been expressly approved
in the general shareholders meeting, the personal liability of directors lapses. It must be stressed here that the Law on Joint Stock
Companies does not provide for suits by the government or third
parties against the organs of the company for violation of their
duty to use proper care when exercising their managerial functions.57 The legal and contractual rights of these parties can be
pursued in court by means of an action directed against the company only (and never against the directors).. The legal literature
emphasizes further that the duty of the company organs to use
proper care does not protect parties other than the company acting
through the shareholders meeting. Other parties, therefore, may
not invoke the legal rules regulating duties of directors as a basis
for tort actions against the directors personally. 8
The duty of company managers to be loyal vis-a-vis the company is not incampatible with the rule that the managers have a
wide latitude in deciding which measures are most suitable to the
interests of the company; acts performed pursuant to this discretionary power cannot be corrected by the courts, whether objection

is made by the shareholders meeting or by individual shareholders.
As previously noted, some situations require, in the best interest
of the company, that concessions be made to third parties, especially to the company's work force for which these third parties do
not have a legal claim. For the shareholders it is, therefore, crucial
that in selecting the members of the company organs, they can
select persons whom they may expect to exercise this economic
discretion in the best interests of the company. It is for this reason
that every shareholder has a legal claim vis-a-vis every other shareholder not to permit a non-shareholder to purchase his voting right
59
and to exercise it in the interest of non-shareholders.
The fact that persons other than shareholders have legal claims
against the company, which the company can fulfill only through
the action of its managerial organs, certainly does not justify a
right of such creditors to nominate members of the organs of the
corporation against the wishes of the shareholders. That an individual is under a legal obligation to do or to pay something to
57. AktG §§ 93, 116, 147.
58. Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTAR, supra note 23, § 93,
note 67 and cases cited.
59. Berle, The Priceof Power: Sale of CorporateControl, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628,
631 (1965).
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another person is certainly no reason to empower the creditor to
require that a guardian be nominated for the debtor, so long as the
debtor is not insane or bankrupt. If the debtor has entrusted the
management of his property to an administrator, his creditors certainly cannot require the administrator to accept a coadministrator nominated by the creditors. Similarly, legal claims of third
parties against a joint stock company can never justify allowing
these third parties representation, with a greater or lesser degree
of authority, in the organs of the company by board members
holding the confidence of the creditors, unless the shareholders
themselves agree. This applies to the credit-giving bankers and
customers no more and no less than to those whose contractual
relationship with the company is that of master and servant. Even
if the organs of the company, under certain circumstances, have
the right and the duty to promote company welfare by satisfying
wishes of third parties even though these third parties have no
legal claim to the satisfaction of such desires, this most certainly
does not justify permitting them to acquire voting powers against
the wishes of the shareholders."
In the Federal Republic one-third of the members of the supervi-

sory boards of most joint stock companies are indeed elected by the
company work force under the Labour Management Relations Act
of 1952.61 German legal literature is unanimously of the opinion
that these board members have the same duties as the members
elected by the shareholders-namely to use proper care in promoting the welfare of the company. They must respect the legal rights
and other interests of the workers, but no more and no less than
must the other board members. They must yield to demands of the
work force but only for the same reasons as the other members-namely for the good of the company. The general opinion is,
therefore, that in case of a strike the supervisory board members
elected by the work force may not themselves participate in such
60. It is conceivable that the government, in permitting a joint stock company

to engage in an activity which is in the public interest and which is not allowed
without a state permit, may condition grant of the permit upon representation of
the government on the executive board of the company, even though the government may not be a shareholder. In such cases the legal requirements concerning

the by-laws of such companies can be phrased to make this possible. For a discussion of public interest directors under American law see Friedmann, The Public
Interest Derivative Suit: A Proposalfor Enforcing CorporateResponsibility, 24
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 317 (1973).
61. See note 2 supra.
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a strike, and certainly may not encourage or further such strikes. 2
It seems that the projected parity codetermination act would no

longer apply the welfare of the company as the only yardstick in
the exercise of all supervisory board members' duty to use proper
care when fulfilling their functions. The explanatory preamble to
the bill lists as a task of the supervisory board that the board take
into consideration "the interests of the shareholders as well as the
work force" in all measures which it takes or refrains from taking.
No longer is each member of the supervisory board to have his own
individual conception of what is best for the company; rather, the
bill is based on the assumption that the members elected by the
work force will be guided primarily by the interests of the workers,
while the board members elected by the shareholders may do the
same with respect to the interests of the shareholders; it is then
assumed that the "equally weighted" composition of the supervisory board will create a "constraint to agree." 63 Under this scheme
the representatives of the work force could use their required approval of decisions which do not concern the work force at all as a
lever to exert additional pressure on the representatives of the
shareholders in questions that do involve the interests of the work
force either directly or indirectly.
This also means that in questions of the administration of the
property of the joint stock company the supervisory board would
no longer be guided primarily by shareholder interests, including
foremost the interest in safeguarding shareholder property against
waste. Neither the board members elected by the work force nor
those elected by the shareholders could be held liable by the share62. Schilling, in 1(2) AKTIENGESETZ: GROSSKOMMENTER, supra note 23, § 116,
note 7 and literature cited, notes 8,9. "The unquestioned point of departure
judging on the liability of the representatives of the work force on the supervisory
board is the equality of their rights and duties in comparison with the other board
members. In case of conflict of interest ... the interests of the company take
precedence over the special interests of the work force . . . ." (emphasis added)

Id. at note 9. In case of strike, dominant legal opinion finds that, because of their
loyalty requirement, the representatives of the work force on the supervisory
board are precluded from actively participating in the strike. Id. Proponents of
parity codetermination oppose this legal interpretation of the old Labor Management Relations Act claiming that in wide areas there is a basic "objective" clash
of interests between the representatives of the shareholders and of the work force
in the organs of a joint stock company. H. VETTER, EUROPAISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 29 (1972).
63. Explanations to § 26 of the Codetermination Bill of 1974, in Parliamentary
Publications of the Bundesrat No. 200/1974.
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holders represented in the general shareholders meeting if, in order
to reach agreement on a given question with the representatives of
the work force, shareholder directors sacrificed the specific interests of the shareholders regarding the property of the company.
The shareholders would be forced to accept the administration of
their property by an organ whose members no longer consider
themselves as trustees of the interests of the shareholders as investors.
V.

CODETERMINATION UNDER THE GERMAN CONSTrrUTION

A.

Constitutionalityand InternationalObligations

It has been shown above that the right of American shareholders
to continue to designate the organs of management in conformity
with German law existing at the time of the investment and, if
they hold a majority of shares, to exercise control over the company, are property rights the deprivation or limitation of which
would be a violation of international law. The violation of international law cannot be cured by arguing that discussion in the Federal Republic had already envisioned an extension of the "codetermination" of the work force when the Commercial Treaty with the
United States was concluded.
Statements contained in articles 14 and 15 of the Basic Law
(Constitution) of the Federal Republic, which lay down certain
constitutional policies in economic matters, and which refer to
"limits" on property rights and to duties of property owners vis-avis the community64 have led some authors65 to conclude that the
64.

Grundgesetz arts. 14, 15 (1961) (W. Ger.). Article 14 provides:

(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content
and limits shall be determined by the laws.
(2)

Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.

(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be
effected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature and
extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by
establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.

Article 15 provides:
Land, natural resources and means of production may for the purpose of
socialization be transferred to public ownership or other forms of publicly
controlled economy by a law which shall provide for the nature and extent
of compensation. In respect of such compensation the third and fourth
sentences of paragraph (3) of Article 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
65. See, e.g., T. SCHWERDTFEGER, UNTERNEHMEISCHE MIrBESTIMMUNG DER AR-
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traditional "liberal" concept of property has been replaced in the
constitution of the Federal Republic by a new "Social" definition
of property, which would justify the introduction of restriction to
the rights of those owning shares in large industrial enterprises.
Even if true, such a definition of property cannot be invoked to
interpret the rules on the protection of property as they are to be
found in the German-American and other treaties.
Treaty provisions according to which property rights legally acquired on the basis of the law in existence at the time of acquisition
are subject to expropriation or limitation only in the public interest
and cannot be undermined by claiming that such rights are not
protected against deprivation or limitation by the constitution of
the host country, and that therefore he who acquires such rights
has to acknowledge the possibility of deprivations imposed by new
laws. It would be irreconcilable with the reciprocity of the protection of investments in international treaties,"6 if one of the contracting states, which in its own constitutional law does not envisage future limitation on the rights of shareholders, could be held
in violation of the treaty if it actually engaged in such deprivation
or limitation, while the other contracting state would be permitted
to do just that. Thus, it is irrelevant for purposes of interpretation
of the German-American Commercial Treaty whether codetermination, and in particular parity codetermination, is constitutional
under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic. This article does
219 (1972); Kindermann, Verfassungswidrigkeit
des Koalitionsentwurfs zur ParitaschenMitbestimmung, 27 DER BErREI 1159
(1974).
66. See Virally, Le Principe de Reciprocite dans le Droit International
Contemporain, 122 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1,
30 (1967).
67. During the negotiations for the former German-American Commercial
Treaty of December 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, the Government of the United States
insisted that American property in Germany be protected against expropriation,
in the event the German Constitution should permit expropriation without compensation.
Robert A. Wilson recounts the details of the negotiations as follows:
A memorandum of the Solicitor of the Department of State concerning the
paragraph of the German treaty, as quoted above, observed that:
BEITNEHMER UND GRUNDGESETZ

"This stipulation will operate to secure protection against arbitrary and
unjust treatment in any particular in which the Government of a country
does not accord its own nationals as liberal treatment as that which is
recognized by international law." (Department of State file 711.622/60,

National Archives). A letter from the Solicitor to the Under Secretary and
the Secretary of State, Dec. 5, 1923, noted as "what was perhaps the major
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not deal with this question; but it should be mentioned that most
professors who testified before a commission of the Bundestag in
1975, did not believe that the 1974 Bill was compatible with the
Grundgesezt. 8 The Federal Constitutional Court, in earlier decisions,69 expressly stated that it was not called upon to determine
the constitutionality of the far-reaching codetermination law for
the coal, iron, and steel industries, and thus reserved opinion on
this question.
The provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic concerning expropriation, socialization, and the limits of property
rights did not prevent the Federal Republic from concluding international treaties on the protection of foreign investments-treaties which, as already explained, forbid the application of parity codetermination to investments by United States
citizens made in the past, and which comport with general international law. If the legislature of the Federal Republic should believe
German proposal" one that was amendatory of that provision of Art. I
which contemplated that property should not be taken without due process
of law and without the payment of just compensation. "The German Ambassador", the letter continued, "stated that the German Constitution permitted the taking of property without payment of just compensation and
that the sentence quoted might be a violation of their fundamental law.
While he intimated that it would be unlikely that the German legislature
would avail itself of its constitutional right to take property of aliens without payment of just compensation, he stated there was a strong feeling in
his country that the Constitution should not be interfered with. The reply
in behalf of the Department was that the sentence in the American text did

not contemplate a yielding of anything which the German Constitution
forbade, and it was, therefore, in no sense a violation of that document; and
that it merely marked an agreement by Germany not to exercise a constitutional right, and one which if exercised would cause immediate protest by
this Government in so far as it applied to American citizens." U.S. Foreign

Relations, 1923, Vol. I, p. 28.
Wilson, Property-ProtectionProvisionsin United States CommercialTreaties,45
AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 99 n.84 (1951).
68. As to the state of opinion in former years see T. SCHWERDTFEGER, UNTERNEHlMERISCHE MITBESTIMMUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER UND GRUNDGESETZ (1972); T.
SCHWERDTFEGER, MrrBESTIMMUNG IN PRIVATEN UNTERNEHMUNGEN (1973). An interesting description in English of the ideologies and economics of workers' partici-

pation in the management of companies may be found in Frame, Worker Participation in Company Management: With ParticularReference to Codetermination
in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 VICTORIA U. OF WELLINGTON L. REv. 417
(1970).

69. Judgment of May 7, 1969, 25 BVerfG 372, 407.
70.

GRUNDGESSTZ arts. 14, 15 (1961) (W. Ger.), supra note 64.
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that the present legislation on workers councils, collective agreements, etc., is not a sufficient realization of the constitutional
program to enforce the "social responsibility" of property owners,
it is up to the legislature to find other means which might be
applied without violating existing international conventions.
B. Parity CodeterminationPriorto 1954
We will now examine eventual consequences of the fact that in
the Federal Republic parity codetermination, similar to that which
is now planned for all large enterprises, was applied to the coal,
iron, and steel industry by the Law of May 21, 1951,71 and was in
existence when the Commercial Treaty with the United States was
concluded in 1954. Since no American capital was invested in those
industries, the American Government had no reason to voice objections against this law when it was adopted, or during the negotiations for the Commercial Treaty.
Parity codetermination in the iron and steel industry had been
introduced even before the Act of 1951 by the British occupation
power when, during the early occupation period, these industries
were subject to the immediate control of the military government.
When new companies were formed as a result of deconcentration
imposed by the occupation powers, an agreement was reached between the "North German Iron and Steel Control" and the trade
union federation of the British zone of occupation that the supervisory board would be composed of five representatives of the work
force and five representatives of the shareholders. The American

military government did not participate in these measures taken
in the British zone of occupation. Indeed it observed with misgivings the policy of the British occupation power, a policy which even
then allegedly had as its ultimate aim the socialization of German
heavy industry. The American military government used its influence to ensure that participation of United States nationals remained exempt from this intervention in German heavy industry,
that the measures taken by the British occupation power were
limited in time, and that the final decisions concerning the property of coal, iron, and steel enterprises were reserved to future,
71. In 1970, a group of experts submitted a detailed report on the practical
experience gained with the law in question. Their proposals for expanding codetermination were much more modest than those contained in the government

draft.
72.

G.

BOLDT, MrrBESTIMMUNGSGEsETz EISEN UND KOHLE 9

(1952).
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freely-constituted German authorities.73
In the same vein, Law Number 27 of the Allied High Commission refers to the intention of the Allies "not to permit the return
to positions of ownership and control of persons having furthered
the aggressive designs of the Nazi party," but contains no provision for codetermination of workers. Thus, the Federal Republic
could not confront the American Government with the argument
that at an earlier stage the United States had already approved the
introduction of parity codetermination in the Federal Republic.
VI.

CODETERMINATION AND AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN OTHER
COUNTRIES

We will now explore whether arrangements similar to the
planned West German codetermination exist elsewhere, and, if so,
how they affect American investment.
A.

The Netherlands

According to the corporate law of The Netherlands, all members
of the organs of a joint stock company have been appointed in the
past solely by the shareholders, just as is true of all other western
countries. A 1971 act74 introduced a change for large enterprises
whereby a new leading organ of joint stock companies (the Administrative Council) coopts its own members75 after being formed

initially in a general shareholders meeting." Members are coopted
subject to the following condition: co-opted members of the
Administrative Council may include persons who are not shareholders but may not include employees of the enterprises in question nor trade union functionaries. Objections against the cooption of a given new member may be raised by the general shareholders meeting on the one hand and by the works council formed
by the workers on the other; a final decision is rendered by a state
organ at its own discretion.17 Not only does the new Dutch corporate law reduce the influence of the shareholders to a much smaller
extent than the planned Codetermination Bill in West Germany,
and not only does it exclude a direct participation of the work force
73. U.S. Foreign Relations 1947 II, 946. The question of protecting foreign
investments in Germany was already at that time the object of a special working
party. See U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1948 II, 698.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Law of May 6, 1971, [hereinafter cited as Dutch Act].
Dutch Act, art. 52(e).
Dutch Act, art. 52(i).
Dutch Act, art. 52(h), 10.
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and trade unions in the said council, but Dutch companies controlled by non-Dutch companies are partially exempt from this
requirement under a special regime. It is true that even such companies must form an Administrative Council, which co-opts its
own members, but in these companies the most important powers
are withheld from the Administrative Council and are exclusively
exercised by the foreign shareholders. This exemption applies:
in the case of those "large" companies which are beneficially owned
to the extent of at least 50%:
(a) by a legal entity, the majority of whose employees are employed outside the Netherlands; or
(b) under a joint-venture agreement, by two or more legal entities
as referred to under (a); or
(c) under a joint-venture agreement, by one or more "large" companies.
"Large" companies are "those companies which have their 'centre
of gravity' outside the Netherlands.""8
Not only are companies with their "center of gravity" outside
the Netherlands secure in the control of their shareholders over the
Dutch company, but the Minister of Justice may also approve
arrangements in other cases that depart from the general law mentioned above. All these exceptions were justified primarily in terms
of a desire not to frighten off foreign capital. At the same time it
was pointed out that any other regulation might have been incompatible with the existing treaties between the Netherlands and the
United States. As Professor Sanders put it:
As far as the U.S. is concerned, there is another argument in favor
of the maintenance of the restrictive application: The Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation which has been in force
between the Netherlands and the U.S. since December 5, 1957. Article VII of this Treaty guarantees for U.S. companies the right "to
control and manage enterprises which they have established or acquired." This provision might also work as a safeguard.79
78. I. VOGELAAR & M. CHESTER, DuTC/ENGLISH COMPANY LAW: A COMPARATIVE
REVIEW 10 (1973). For further details of the exceedingly complex provisions of
Dutch Law see W. SLAGTER, COMPENSIUM VAN HET ONDERNEMINGSRECHT 236 (1973).
79. P. SANDERS, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR VENNOTSCHAPPEN, VERENIGHINGEN EN
STIcHTINGEN 275 (1970).
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Yugoslavia

In Yugoslavia, private property in economic enterprises was, it
will be recalled, totally expropriated at the outset of the present
regime. In non-state-owned enterprises operating today, the members of the work force have a prima facie position equivalent to the
shareholders of a "capitalist" joint stock company. Recent Yugoslav laws permit foreign capital participation of up to 50 per cent

in such enterprises. Through contracts between the foreign investors and the organs formed by the workers, it can be arranged that
the former, in theory at least, have an equal influence on the management of the enterprise." The Yugoslav Constitution was accordingly amended to provide:
the rights of foreign nationals who invest in Yugoslav United Work
Organizations [i.e. enterprises] cannot be diminished, once the
contract is signed, be it by law or other acts.8 '
A recent law stipulates further that:
If, after the investment contract has entered into force, the law
regulating such investments is changed, the conditions of the investment contract remain subject to the stipulations of the original
contract and to the laws which were in force the day the contract
entered into force, provided that they were more favorable to the
foreign contracting partner than the later laws and regulations, unless th6 contracting partners come to an amicable agreement to
change certain points to bring them in line with the later laws and
regulations."
The laws of the United States do not forbid American nationals
from assuming the risk of such participation in Yugoslav enterprises. No existing treaty arrangements between the United States
and Yugoslavia correspond to those between the United States and
the Federal Republic cited earlier. Nevertheless, insurance protection against expropriation of American investments in Yugoslavia
is provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.13
80. For a discussion of the Yugoslav law see Glickman & Sukijasovic,
Yugoslav Worker Management and Its Effect on Foreign Investment, 12 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 260 (1971); 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL. 271 (1973).
81. USTAV SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE (Constitution)
amend. XII, 4 (1971) (Yugoslavia).
82. Law of April 13, 1973, art. 20, Official Cazette (1973).
83. Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, § 104, 22 U.S.C. § 2199(g) (Supp. II, 1972),
amending 22 U.S.C. § 2199 (1970).
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Moreover, a bilateral agreement does provide that the United
States "reserves its rights to assert a claim in its sovereign capacity
in the eventuality of a denial of justice or other question of state
responsibility as defined in international law.

' 84

This enables the

United States to insist on Yugoslav adherence to the statute cited
above.
Vii.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of the ongoing chapter may be summarized as
follows:
1. The right of American shareholders85 in companies of the
Federal Republic to demand that members of the supervisory
board continue to be elected under the regulations hitherto in force
is a property right protected against expropriation and encroachment by the German-American Commercial Treaty of 1954, especially in light of its most-favored-nation clause and in light of other
treaties for the protection of investments which the Federal Republic has concluded with third countries.
2. The introduction of parity codetermination would be an encroachment on the rights of American shareholders in violation of
the Treaty.
3. Whether the introduction of parity codetermination is allowed or recommended by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic
is irrelevant to the question of whether it is compatible with international law.
When the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany presented the foregoing arguments to the Bonn Government in 1974
as a confidential opinion on behalf of interested American inves84. Investment Agreement with Yugoslavia, Jan. 18, 1973, art. 20, T.I.A.S.

No. 7630.
85. Although the German-American Commercial Treaty of 1954 expressly recognizes that control of a company enjoys legal protection against expropriation,
etc., the question does not come up, as it does in the case of compensation claims

for the total expropriation of the rights of foreign stockholders, whether the foreign majority stockholder who exercises control must be granted a higher compensation under international law than the other stockholders, since control constitutes a separate "right." Given the fact that a diminution of the voting rights of
the individual stockholders through the creation of voting rights for nonstockholders in the election of the members of the supervisory board of a company certainly
amounts to a direct restriction of the rights of foreign stockholders in a German
joint stock company, it is not necessary to examine the question whether the
introduction of codetermination is an act of expropriation against the company
itself.
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tors, the paper found its way into the hands of trade union leaders
who sharply criticized the Chamber for an alleged interference in
the internal affairs of the Federal Republic and for trying to obtain
better treatment for "multinationals.""6 Even before the Bill had
been introduced by the government, the West German electorate
had been belabored with such slogans as "democracy in the eco-

nomic area," "equality of capital and labour," etc. In 1975, even
the oil crisis was turned to the advantage of advocates of parity
codetermination. While oil prices were low, consumers had been
kept in ignorance about the fact that low prices were imposed upon
the producing countries by a cartel of concessionaires and distributors, sometimes even in violation of the dispositions contained in
the concession agreements. 7 The public had been kept in ignorance of the fact that experts had warned in time of the upcoming
oil crisis, and that inactive government officials had told them that
surely the "giants of private industries would take care of things.""
When oil prices rose drastically, consumers were told that this was
due to the long ignored faults of the multinationals and that this
should be corrected by introducing parity codetermination as a
means to control them.
Opponents of parity codetermination also contributed to the
general confusion. For too long West German managers failed to
86.

Some critics of the American Chamber of Commerce pretended that for-

eign investors should absolutely refrain from influencing the politics of the host
country. However, efforts (which, of course, cannot be carried out by ballot) to
influence developments that affect the security of the investment, its profitability, etc., cannot be considered illegal unless expressly prohibited by law, particularly if domestic companies are allowed to bring influence to bear in the same
manner. Nobody will scold foreign workers in West Germany for defending their

interests in the host country by analogous means.
87. None other than Henry Ford, H has stated bluntly that in former times
"the price for raw oil had been kept disproportionately low, the waste of a limited

natural resource had been condoned, and the profits from oil extraction unequally
distributed." Address by Henry Ford, II, before the Confederation of German
Industry 25th Anniversary, 1974.

As a specialist in international law, the author of this article had warned
against trying to justify the earlier situation in the oil market through the artificial argument that contracts between states and foreign private enterprises have

the same legal quality as international treaties between states. Wengler, Accords
entre etats et entreprises etrangeres:Sont-ils des traites de droit international?,
76 REVUE GENERALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 313 (1972).
88. For details on the lack of planning in the energy policy of the United

States Government and in the management policies of the oil companies see S.
KLEBANOFF, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY

(1974).
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develop other ways to stimulate the interest of the worker in "his"
enterprise; instead, they agreed to parity codetermination "in
principle," albeit with the hidden reservation that, despite numerical parity in the composition of the supervisory board, the shareholders would have the final word anyhow.89
Nevertheless, in 1975 a wave of criticism arose against the 1974
Bill in its original form, and by January, 1976, many modifications
had been proposed by the two political parties in power. Currently
the final version of the act to be adopted by parliament remains
an open question.
Even if the result would be that by vesting the chairman of the
supervisory council with a tie-breaking vote and some other means
parity codetermination in its proper meaning would not be fully
realized, the question will remain whether the act will be compatible with the German-American Treaty of 1954, the most-favorednation clause and the investment protection conventions of the
Federal Republic with third countries, and, last but not least, with
general international law.
At first glance, the arguments elaborated in this article appear
to refer only to American investments in the Federal Republic, but
American and German investment in other countries is also involved. Should the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany agree between themselves that codetermination as proposed in West Germany can be reconciled with the treaties concerning the protection of investments that they have concluded
with each other and with third parties, then the two countries
89. In 1967, Professor Pleyer deemed it a "wise policy" that the issue of the
constitutionality of parity codetermination in the steel industry had not been
raised before the Supreme Constitutional Court, though he was suggesting at the
same time that even statutory changes in the distribution of power among shareholders might be confiscatory. Pleyer Propri&6et Contrat,Instruments de l'ordre
economique dans la R~publique Fd~raled'Allemagne, 1967 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARA 373, 378. For a discussion of the constitutionality of parity
codetermination in the steel industry see text accompanying note 68 supra.
In the Feldmuehle case, decided by the Federal Constitutional Court, minority
stockholders protested fusion with another company in which they lost their
shares. In its judgment of Aug. 7, 1962, 14 BVerfG 263, the court ruled that they
might be excluded, but only if there was more than a bare majority in the shareholders meeting for such a measure, and only on condition of full compensation.
A deprivation of shareholder voting rights-especially one without compensation-in favor of the voting power of other shareholders or of people who are not
shareholders at all is no more covered by the Feldmuehle decision than it is by

American court decisions.
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could hardly argue the contrary in their dialogue with third countries.
Besides the Netherlands," several other countries in Western
Europe have introduced codetermination in recent years, though
mostly as minority codetermination of workers, as for instance in
Norway"1 and Luxembourg. 2 In other countries plans for similar
measures are on the table, as in Switzerland,93 Great Britain,"4 and
France. 5 The draft European Company Statute proposed by the
Commission of the European Economic Community also provides
90. See text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
91. Law of May 12, 1972, [1972] Lovtid. II Nr. 27, at 418.
92. Law of May 6, 1974, [1974] Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand Duche
de Luxembourg, A Nr. 35, at 620.
The Luxembourg law emphasizes that the Administrative Board members
named by the employees are responsible and liable to the company and the
shareholders in conformity with the normal provisions of corporate law, whereas
discussion about codetermination in West German industry shows that the term
"responsibility" has largely lost its meaning of a personal liability for faults
committed in the exercise of a function. Using the word "responsibility" one has
in mind often only the power to make decisions, and not the liability for damages
caused by improper exercise of such power. The participants of a conference

called by the International Labour Organisation in 1969 (see note 101 infra) were
already allegedly in unanimous agreement "on the principle that participation,
in order to be effective, required the acceptance of responsibility."
93. In Switzerland the constitutional basis for codetermination in a wider
sense must first be created by popular referendum. The Federal Council (the
Swiss Executive) has stated that
codetermination authority of the work force on the level of the administrative councils of joint stock companies is irreconcilable with the system of
corporate law based on the constitutional provisions now in force, which is
characterized by the principle of private ownership and the resulting comprehensive shareholders' power of disposal. [1973] Bundesblatt II 414.
The proposals of the Federal Council tend to erect another barrier against impairment of property rights through codetermination by stipulating that codetermination "must be reasonable and safeguard the viability and profitability of the
enterprise." In view of this, the question whether a codetermination scheme that
interfered with property rights would be reconcilable with Swiss international
treaties has not arisen.
94. In Great Britain, the trade unions published a "Green Book" at the end
of May, 1974, demanding the introduction of codetermination modelled after the
proposed Codetermination Bill of the Federal Republic. It is significant that the
Green Book expressly rejects the idea that the work force representatives in the
organs of management would hold the same responsibilities as those elected by
the shareholders.
95. See Rapport du Comite d'Etude pour la Rlforme de 1' enterprise (Rapport
Sudreau) 1974.
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for representatives of the employees on the boards of these future
companies."
So it may be expected that other countries on other continents
will follow with more or less radical laws of their own. Perhaps in
those other countries codetermination, even if not parity codetermination, would have the most intensive consequences for foreign

investors." Joint ventures under which domestic and foreign capital enjoy equal participation,98 and which are so important to the
development of the economy of these countries, would be deprived
of their very basis for existence," namely the balance between the
voting powers of domestic and foreign investors. It is most interesting to note that the need to uphold this balance has been clearly
recognized in "socialist" countries that encourage foreign investments in the form of joint ventures. A Romanian decree of 1972,11,
for instance, provides that all worker representatives in joint venture enterprises composed of Romanian and foreign shareholders
are to be counted among the Romanian half of the membership of
the company board.' 1
96.

For discussion of the proposed European Company Statute see COMM'N OF
(Information
Memo P-24, May, 1975). The draft Statute appears in [1975] BULLETIN OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES Supp. 4/75.
97. In a recent report, the State Department did not recognize encroachment
on shareholder voting rights as disguised expropriation. U.S. Departmentof State
Report on Nationalization,Expropriation,and Other Takings of U.S. and Certain
ForeignProperty Since 1960, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 84 (1972).
98. The formation of a company endowed in equal parts with domestic and
foreign capital often results from the fact that the domestic investor contributes
contacts with domestic customers and government offices which the foreign investor lacks, while the latter supplies technological and organizational knowledge as
well as quite frequently a managerial drive, which are not available to the domestic investor.
99. Also, if the corporate law of a country provides for different voting rights
for different categories of stockholders, such schemes are destroyed if codetermination by non-shareholders is introduced by legislation. See DANISH LAWYER'S
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE

Ass'N, COMMENT ON THE 1972 DANISH DRAFT LAW ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS (1973).

100. Decree of November 2, 1972, No. 424, art. 34, 3.
If, because of different nationalities among the shareholders, the Administrative Board must consist of fixed numbers of Luxembourg citizens and foreigners,
the worker representatives are to be counted among the Luxembourg board members up to half of their total, according to the new Luxembourg law. See note 92
supra.
101. To the limited extent that East European countries allow codetermination by the workers, those states admit that codetermination, by authorizing
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A legal opinion prepared by the Federal Ministry of Interior °2
claimed that codetermination as provided in the original government draft does not entail expropriation, or anything similar,
within the meaning of the treaties concluded by the Federal Republic. Thus, an eventual impairment of the interest of West German investors in third countries by a possible introduction of parity codetermination there seems indeed to be regarded by that
department as being in conformity with existing treaty obligations.
This is all the more surprising as the Federal Ministry for Economic Assistance seems to be well aware that the Conventions for
the Protection of Investments are the last important bulwark
against the tendencies expressed in the Charter of the Economic
Rights and Duties of States which was adopted on December 12,
1974, by the United Nations General Assembly against the votes
of the United States, West Germany, and a few other countries.' 3
The opinion by the Federal Ministry of the Interior goes to the
extreme of claiming that an inadmissible deprivation of property
would occur only if "the totality of investors would be forced,
against their will, to submit to decisions of other persons in fundamental questions of the conduct of the enterprise and of management policy."' 4 This argument ignores that controlling voting
unqualified persons to participate in management, is not conducive to the wellbeing of either the enterprise or the common weal. See T. RABSKA, RAPPORT'S:
POLONAIS PRESENTES AU NEUVI9ME CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE

227

(1974). The export conference convoked by the International Labour Organisation
in 1969 expressed the following opinion: "Another prerequisite for successful participation on which a number of experts placed great emphasis was the need for
the workers' representatives concerned to have the knowledge and skill required
to deal effectively with the great variety of sometimes highly complicated issues
which came up for decision at the undertaking level." Id. at 160. The report
concludes: "It is evidently very difficult, for these reasons, to give a cut-and-dried

definition of workers' participation in decisions. It will also be clear that to put
such participation into effect, no matter what formula be chosen, is an exceedingly delicate matter, since the economic mainspring of society itself is likely to

be affected," The I.L.O. recognized that codetermination rights of workers' representatives "required, on the part of the trade union movement, a high degree of
strength and stability ....It was also noted that, while some of these conditions
were fulfilled in certain highly industrailized countries, this was not yet the case
in some of the developing countries. . . ." INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OGRANIZATION,
PARTICIPATION OF WORKERS IN DECISIONS WITHIN UNDERTAKINGS

159 (Labour-

Management Relations Series No. 33, 1969).
102. The Ministry refused an invitation to publish this opinion.
103. See 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 250 (1975).
104. Professor Daeubler of the University of Bremen (which is noted as a home
of left-wing professors) argues that constitutional guarantees of property would
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power of German investors is a condition to giving insurance cover
under the West German system of insurance for overseas investments,1 1 5 and that on the other side treaties for the protection of
investments expressly prohibit restrictions on each one of the
rights that have been acquired in conjunction with the investment
by every single investor." 8
As shown in part II above, the common sense of American judges
recognized a long time ago that the property of the individual
stockholder is definitely affected if his voting rights are taken or
restricted in favor of other stockholders in deviation from the previously existing legal situation. Whether a weakening of the voting
rights of the individual stockholders in favor of non-stockholders
and the ensuing modification of relative voting powers of different
groups of shareholders amount to a taking of property or a restriction of property rights does not, therefore, depend upon whether
this amounts at the same time to taking away the power of the
totality of stockholders. Even Yugoslavia as a socialist country has
constitutionally prohibited any later change of law of the status
quo of foreign shareholders' rights as they are at the time of investment. 0
The Federal Ministry of the Interior for West Germany went so

far as to describe parity codetermination as a legitimate means of
defining the legal nature and limits of shareholder property. It
seems to have forgotten that expropriation of Jewish property
under National Socialism was effectuated not solely by formally
transferring title to other people, but often by restricting the ownbe impaired only if "the stockholders together can no longer exert decisive influence." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 1, 1975, at 13.
105. See note 33 supra. In comparison, the Yugoslav law concerning the establishment of subsidiaries of Yugoslav comapnies abroad permits them only if "control of the material and financial business activity" of the foreign subsidiary by
the Yugoslav parent is assured. Law of July 21, 1972, art. 8, § 7, as amended Mar.
7, 1973.
106. See, e.g., Treaty between Germany and Indonesia, Nov. 8, 1968, art. 3,
§ 3 of the Protocol, page 8 supra.
107. USTAV SOCIJALIsTIcKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE (Constitution)
amend. XII, 4 (1971) (Yugoslavia). See supra note 81. In Mexico and Japan,
though these countries tend to limit control for foreign investors, codetermination
in the organs of domestic companies is not yet a live issue. The 1973 Mexican law
on Mexican and foreign investments simply states that the representation of
foreigners in the organs of management may not be larger than their proportionate share of the capital investment. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and
Regulate Foreign Investment, art. V (Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973). See also D.
HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN 265 (1973).
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ers in the exclusive administration of their property rights through
the imposition of State-appointed "administrators" or "trustees."
Under the restitution laws enacted by the Western occupying powers and supplemented by the federal legislature,"' there was a long
controversy in postwar West Germany about what sort of powers
an "administrator" imposed by the Nazis must have had before
such action could be deemed a "deprivation" on behalf (or in
favor) of the "Reich", even if the property later came into the
hands not of the Reich but of a private person. The Third Chamber
0 9 finally concluded that the releof the Supreme Restitution Court"
vant acts "had deliberately been formulated in elastic terms to
cover all relevant measures of the Reich and its organs that would
justify a restitution claim. Therefore, the legislature did not try in
a perfectionist spirit to list all the possible forms of 'taking' of
property such as the imposition of a trustee, executor, administrator, or other State appointee." '
As early as 1962, the Supreme Restitution Court stated that the
essence of property is that the owner "can exclude others from
exerting any influence upon it" and that "it is with these very
property rights that the Reich deliberately interfered."' 1 Installing
a "co-administrator" with veto power who finally forced the persecutee to divest himself of his enterprise would surely have been

considered a "taking" to be retracted according to the restitution
laws. For this reason, all limitations on voting rights and voting
power had to be rescinded when shares were returned to their
rightful owners.' On the other hand, if a controlling shareholder
had been deprived of his shares, control had to be restored to him,
even if in the meantime the joint stock company had been converted, e.g., into a partnership."'
108. See Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution,
67 Nw. U.L. REv. 479 (1972).
109. The Supreme Restitution Court is composed of German judges and
judges from the former occupying powers and from "neutral" countries.
110. Judgment of Sept. 3, 1965, 12 ORGE 742 (Decisions of the Supreme

Restitution Court).
111.
112.

Judgment of Feb. 5, 1966, [1966] RzW 323.
R. GODIN, RUECKERSTATTUNGSGESETZE 75, 78, 86 (2d ed. 1950).

113.

KUBUSCHOK AND WE1SSTEIN, RUECKERSTATrUNGSRECHT 150 (1950).

If the claimant owned a considerable number of shares which gave him an
influence in the management of the joint stock company, his postwar participation in the transformed enterprise must take a form that restores the
capital percentage of his contribution and his former legal position to the
extent possible, even though the legal and economic status of the successor
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The proposition that even smaller voting powers are to be regarded as assets protected against expropriative restrictions is intensively confirmed by the Australian Foreign Takeovers Act of
1975 which provides:
Sec. 8: A reference in this Act to control of the voting power in a
corporation is a reference to control that is direct or indirect, including control that is exercisable as a result or by means of arrangements, whether or not having legal or equitable force, and whether
or not based on legal or equitable rights.
Sec. 9: (1). For the purposes of this Act:
(a). A person shall be taken to hold a substantial interest in a
corporation if the person, alone or together with any associate or
associates of the person, is in a position to control not less than 15
per centum of the voting power in the corporation or holds interests
in not less than 15 per centum of the issued shares of the corporation; and
(b). 2 or more persons shall be taken to hold an aggregate substantial interest in a corporation if they, together with any associate or
associates of any of them, are in a position to control not less than
40 per centum of the voting power in the corporation or hold interests in not less than 40 per centum of the issued shares in the
corporation.
It is interesting also to note that codetermination of workers as
such is regarded as an encroachment on shareholder rights when
the state (or government) is the holder of the shares. In Norway
the question was raised whether codetermination of workers in
those companies whose stock is entirely owned by the state was
compatible with the principles of Norwegian constitutional law
concerning control of public property. When a public enterprise
owned by the City of Bremen and organized as a limited liability
company (GmbH) recently sought to change its charter so that the
city organs and the workers would have equal representation on the
company's supervisory board, the company's request was denied
in court under the rationale that the public interest prohibited
depriving control from the organs of a company in public owner114
ship, whether owned by a city or by a state.
enterprise may be totally different ....

If, for instance, the majority own-

ership in the former joint stock company gave the possessor control of the
enterprise-with his risk limited to the capital he put in- -his legal posi-

tion in the present partnership can be adapted to his former position by
giving him a participation in the form of a limited liability partnership
vested with special rights to control the management of the enterprise.
114. Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1975. In comparison, the
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In a more recent case involving American investments guaranteed by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),115
arbitrators stated clearly that the point of improper interference
with property rights is reached before formal expropriation takes
place or decisions are forced on all the owners of the capital of the
company in question. In that case the American company had an
interest in a Chilean company in the form of a credit grant. As a
result of measures of the Allende Government, such as wage raises
imposed by statutes, additional social insurance requirements,

other taxes, pressure tactics, threats of nationalization, and frozen
bank accounts, the Chilean company could barely pay its current

obligations and could not meet the requirements of the credit grant
of the American company. Contrary to the OPIC point of view, the
arbitration court decided that these developments were sufficient

to trigger the guarantee; the Chilean enterprise in which American
capital had been invested had been prevented "from exercising
effective control over the use and disposition of a substantial portion of its property.""' Furthermore, the court rejected the argument of OPIC that the measures were compatible with international law since they had been taken in harmony with the goals of

the Chilean Constitution. When property rights guaranteed by
treaties are subjected to expropriation-like interference or restric"control" exercised by the council representing the work force in Polish state
enterprises is by no means identical with the "control and management" mentioned in the treaties of the United States with the Federal Republic and other
countries. It is solely the right to engage in non-binding criticism of the management of the enterprise. "Les organismes de l'autogestion ne disposent pas du droit
de sanction s'ils constatent des irregularites; ils ne peuvent s'ingerer directement
dans l'activite qu'ils controlent. Ils ne peuvent presenter que des propositions au
directeur de l'entreprise." T. RABsKA, RAPPORTS POLONAIS PRESENTES AU NEUVIEME
CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr COMPARE 216 (1974).

In state enterprises run by a single "director," the personnel council has the
right to propose someone for this position but the nominating organ is never
bound by such a proposal. For a description of the actual working of "selfadministration" by the workers in Yugoslav enterprises-which has been unable
to prevent even strikes-see
DEMOCRATIE (1974).

BOONZAGER, FLAEs

&

RAMONDT, AUTORITEIT EN

115. See I.T.T. (United States v. Chile), 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1307
(1974).
116. The World Bank also proposed to create an international institution
giving insurance for "expropriation or equivalent governmental action or inaction
which deprives the insured investor of effective control over . . .his investments." HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

(Comm. Print 1973).
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tion, such limitations, even if constitutionally permissible or encouraged,11 7 violate international law.
VIII.

A.

APPENDICES

ProvisionsDealing with Protectionof Property Rights in
United States Bilateral Treaties with Third Countries

1. BELGIUM-Treaty on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, arts. IV, VI, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S.
No. 5432.
2.

DENMARK-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,

Oct. 1, 1951, arts. VI, VII, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797.
3. ETHIOPIA-Treaty on Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7,
1951, art. VIII, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864.
4. FRANCE-Treaty on Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, arts. IV, V,
[1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625.
5. GREECE-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Aug. 3, 1951, arts. VII, XIII, [1954] 2 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No.
2948.
6. IRAN-Treaty on Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, art. IV, [1957] 1 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No.
3853.
7.. IRELAND-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Jan. 21, 1950, art. VI, VIII, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155.
8. ISRAEL-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Aug. 23, 1951, arts. VI, VII, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No.
2948.
117. Recognition that codetermination violates international law when its introduction encroaches upon the existing voting power of foreign investors would
not preclude other reforms of existing corporate law in European and other countries. New laws could provide, for instance, that a body comprising workers,
creditors, customers, or even government representatives in addition to the shareholders be consulted about certain proposed measures before the organs of the
company take a decision. Workers might be encouraged and assisted through

collective bargaining agreements or tax incentives to acquire shares in "their"
company. Steps might be taken to insure that the interests of such workershareholders, as those of the general shareholding public, be assured proportionate representation in the organs of the company along with the representatives

elected by the "big" shareholders. This might be done in West Germany by

reforming the proxy voting right of banks, and perhaps the introduction of the
United States and Argentine concept of cumulative voting.
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9. ITALY-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb.
2, 1948, arts. Im, V, 63 Stat., pt. 2, 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.

10. ITALY-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Jan. 26, 1951, art. I., [1961] 1 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685.
11. JAPAN-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
April 2, 1953, arts. V, VI, VII, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No.
2863.
12. KOREA-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
March 27, 1956, arts. VI, VII, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No.
3947.
13. LUXEMBOURG-Treaty on Friendship, Establishment and
Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, arts. IV, VI, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 251,
T.I.A.S. No. 5306.
14.

MUSCAT

AND OMAN AND DEPENDENCIES-Treaty on Amity,

Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, arts. IV,
V, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530.
15.

NETHERLANDS-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navi-

gation, March 27, 1956, arts. VI, VII, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043,
T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
16. NICARAGUA-Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, arts. VI, VII, [1958] 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No.
4024.
17.

PAKISTAN-Treaty on Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12,

1959, arts. VI, VII, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683.
18. THAILAND-Treaty on Amity and Economic Relations, May
29, 1966, arts. III, IV [1968] 5 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540.
19. ToGo-Treaty on Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8,
1966, arts. IV, V, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193.
20. VIET NAM-Treaty on Amity and Economic Relations, April
3, 1961, arts. IV, V, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
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B. "Expropriation"as Defined in the Treaties for the Mutual
Protection of Capital Investments Concluded by the Federal
Republic of Germany*
1. PAKISTAN, Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23 (1963).
Art. 3(1): Investments by nations or companies of either Party
shall enjoy protection and security in the territory of the other
Party. Art. 3(2): Nationals or companies of either Party shall not
be subjected to expropriation of their investments in the territory
of the other Party except for public benefit against compensation,
which shall represent the equivalent of the investments affected.

Such compensation shall be actually realizable and freely transferable in the currency of the other Party without undue delay. Adequate provision shall be made at or prior to the time of expropriation for the determination and the grant of such compensation.
The legality of any such expropriation and the amount of compensation shall be subject to review by due process of law.
Protocol: (3) The term "Expropriation" within the meaning of
paragraph (2) of Article 3 shall also pertain to acts of sovereign
power which are tantamount to expropriation, as well as measures
of nationalization.
2. MALAYSIA, Dec. 12, 1960.
Same as No. 1.
3. GREECE, March 27, 1961.
Art. 3(1) ....
Art. 3(2): Kapitalanlagen von Staatsangeh6rigen und Gesellschaften eines Vertragsstaates dfirfen im Hoheitsgebiet des anderen
Vertragsstaates nur zum allegemeinen Wohl und gegen Entschadigung enteignet werden. Die Entschadigung muss dem Wert der
enteigneten Kapitalanlagen entsprechend tatstchlich verwertbar
und frei transferierbar sein sowie nach den Rechtsvorschriften
eines jeden Vertragsstaates entweder im voraus oder mindestens
unverzuglich geleistet werden. Sp9testens im Zeitpunkt der Enteignung muss in geeigneter Weise fur die Festsetzung und Leistung der Entschadigung Vorsorge getroffen sein. Uber die Rechtmassigkeit der Enteignung und die Hohe der Entschadigung muss
in einem ordentlichen Gerichtsverfahren entschieden werden konnen.
* As of the date of this writing, the treaties listed in this appendix have not
been published in United Nations Treaty Series. They may be found in the West
German Bundesgesetzblatt.
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Protokoll: 2(a) Die Bestimmungen des Artikels 3 Abs. 2 gelten
auch fur die Oberfihrung einer Kapitalanlage in 6ffentliches Eigentum, ihre Unterstellung unter 6ffentliche Aufsicht oder ghnliche Eingriffe der ffentlichen Hand. (b) MaBnahmen des
Staates, die auf Antrag der Glaubiger eines Unternehmens im
Falle des Konkurses oder zur Abwendung des Konkurses oder auf
Antrag des Kapitalanlegers vorgenommen werden, gelten nicht als
Eingriffee im Sinne des Artikels 3 Abs. 2. (c) Unter Enteignung ist
die Entziehung oder Beschrgnkung jedes Verm6gensrechts zu verstehen, das allein oder mit anderen Rechten zusammen eine Kapitalanlage bildet.
4.

TOGO, May 16, 1961.

Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.

Ptotokoll: (4) Die Bestimmungen des Artikels 3 Abs. 2 gelten auch
fur die Oberftihrung einer Kapitalanlage in 6ffentliches Eigentum
sowie fur alle sonstigen hoheitlichen MaBnahmen, durch die eine
Kapitalanlage entzogen oder beschrgnkt wird und die einer Enteignung oder Verstaatlichung gleichkommen.
5.

MoRocco, August 31, 1961.

Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protokoll: (4) Die Bestimmungen des Artikels 3 Abs. 2 gelten auch
fur die Qberfflhrung Kapitalanlage im Wffentlichen Eigentum, ihre Unterstellung unter 6ffentliche Aufsicht oder dhnliche
Eingriffe der 6ffentlichen Hand. Unter Enteignung ist die Entziehung oder Beschrankung jedes Verm6gensrechts zu verstehen, das
allein oder mit anderen Rechten zusammen eine Kapitalanlage
bildet.
6. LIBERIA, Dec. 12, 1961.
Art. 3(1)(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3(a): (4) The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 shall also apply to the transfer of an investment to public
ownership, to the subjection of an investment to public control,
and to similar interventions by public authorities. Expropriation
shall mean the taking away of any property or any property right,
which in itself or in conjunction with other rights constitutes an
investment, or curtailing the management, use or employment of

such property right by such measures of sovereign power and to
such an extent as are tantamount to expropriation.
7. THAILAND, Dec. 13, 1961, 541 U.N.T.S. 181 (1965).
Same as No. 1.
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8. GUINEA, March 19, 1962.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protokoll Zu Artikel 2: (4) Die Bestimmungen des Artikels 3 Abs.
2 gelten such fur die tberffihrung einer Kapitalanlage in ffentliches Eigentum, ihre Unterstellung unter 6ffentliches Eigentum,
ihre Unterstellung unter offentliche Aufsicht oder Ahnliche Eingriffe der offentlichen Hand. Unter "Enteignung" ist die Entziehung oder Beschrankung jeden Vermigenswertes oder Rechts, das
allein oder mit anderen Verm6genswerten oder Rechten zusammen
eine Kapitalanlage bildet, zu verstehen, durch hoheitliche
MaBnahmen und in einem Ausmass, das einer Enteignung gleich-

kommt.
9. TURKEY, June 20, 1962.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protokoll Zu Artikel 3 Abs. 2: (a) Enteignung im Sinne des Artikels
3 Absatz 2 bedeutet die Entziehung oder Beschrdnkung jedes im
Sinne dieses Vertrages als Kapitalanlage geltenden Vermdgens
oder Vermogensrechtes durch hoheitliche MaBnahmen und in
einem AusmaB, das einer Enteignung gleichkommt. Artikel 3 Absatz 2 gilt auch fur die Verstaatlichung einer Kapitalanlage.
10.

CAMEROUN,

June 29, 1962.

Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (4) The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article
3 shall also apply to the transfer of an investment to public ownership, to the subjection of an investment to public control, and to
similar interventions by public authorities. Expropriation shall
mean the taking away or restricting by sovereign measure and to
an extent equivalent to expropriation, of any asset or right which
in itself or in conjunction with other assets or rights constitutes an
investment.
11.

MADAGASCAR,

Sept. 21, 1962.

Same as No. 8.
12. SUDAN, Feb. 7, 1963.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3 para. 2: (3) Expropriation shall be deemed
to be any kind of deprivation by acts of sovereign power of any
asset or right which constitutes an investment or is a part thereof,
other acts of sovereign power which are tantamount to expropriation, as well as measures of nationalization.
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LANKA,
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Nov. 8, 1963.

Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (3) The term "expropriation" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 3 shall also pertain to acts of
sovereign power which are tantamount to expropriation, as well as
measures of nationalization. Expropriation shall mean the taking
away or restricting of any property right which in itself or in conjunction with other rights constitutes an investment.
14. TUNISIA, Dec. 20, 1963.
Same as No. 5.
15. SENEGAL, Jan. 24, 1964.

Same as No. 5.
16. KOREA, Feb. 4, 1964.
Same as No. 12.
17. PHILIPPINES, March 3, 1964.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (5) (a) Expropriation shall mean the taking
in whole or in part of any investment as well as the restricting of
any investment the effect of which is tantamount to such taking.
(b) The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 shall also apply to
the transfer of an investment to public ownership as well as to the
subjection of an investment to public control or to similar interventions by public authorities the effect of which is tantamount to
expropriation as defined in paragraph (a) above.
18. NIGER, Oct. 29, 1964.
Same as No. 5.
19. KENYA, Dec. 4, 1964.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (3) (a) The provisions of paragraph 2 of
Article 3 shall also apply to the transfer of an investment to public
ownership, to the subjection of an investment to public control, or
to similar interventions by public authorities. Expropriation shall
mean the compulsory taking away or restricting of any property
right which in itself or in conjunction with other rights constitutes
an investment.

20. TANZANIA, Jan. 30, 1965.
Art. 3(2): Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (3) (a) The provisions of paragraph 2 of
Article 3 shall also apply to the transfer of an investment to public
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ownership, to the subjection of an investment to public control, or
to similar interventions by public authorities. Expropriation shall
mean the taking away of any property right which in itself or in
conjunction with other rights constitutes an investment, as well as
the restriction of any such property right, if the restriction is tantamount to expropriation.
21. SIERRA LEONE, March 8, 1965.
Same as No. 19.
22. COLOMBIA, June 11, 1965.
Same as No. 5.

23.

ECUADOR, June 28, 1965.

Same as No. 5.
24. CENTRAL AFRICAN
Same as No. 5.

25.

CONGO

REPUBLIC,

Aug. 23, 1965.

(VR), Sept. 13, 1965.

Same as No. 5.

26.

IRAN,

Nov. 11, 1965.

Art. 3 Same as No. 1.
Protocol Ad Article 3: (4) (a) Expropriation shall mean the taking
away or restricting of any property right which is considered an
investment in this Treaty, by such measures of sovereign power
and to such an extent as are tantamount to expropriation. The
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 shall also apply to the nationalization of an investment.
27. IVORY COAST, Oct. 27, 1966.
Same as No. 5.
28. UGANDA, Nov. 29, 1966.
Same as No. 19.
29.

ZAMBIA, Dec. 10, 1966.

Same as No. 19.
30.

TSCHAD,

April 11, 1967.

Same as No. 5.
31. RUANDA, May 18, 1967.
Same as No. 5.
32. GHANA, May 19, 1967.
Same as No. 21.
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33. INDONESIA, Nov. 8, 1968.
See text at 8.
34.

ZAIRE, March 18, 1969.

Same as No. 5.
35.

GABUN, May 16, 1969.

Same as No. 5.
36. MAURITIUS, May 25, 1971.
Same as No. 5.
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